NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Volume 8 by R. Anton Braun & Ellen R. McGrattan
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1993, Volume 8
Volume Author/Editor: Olivier Blanchard and Stanley Fischer, editors
Volume Publisher: MIT Press
Volume ISBN: 0-252-02364-4
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/blan93-1
Conference Date: March 12-13, 1993
Publication Date: January 1993
Chapter Title: The Macroeconomics of War and Peace
Chapter Author: R. Anton Braun, Ellen R. McGrattan
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11001
Chapter pages in book: (p. 197 - 258)R. Anton Braun and Ellen R. McGrattan 
UNIVERSITY  OF VIRGINIA  AND FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK OF 
MINNEAPOLIS,  AND DUKE  UNIVERSITY  AND FEDERAL 
RESERVE  BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS 
The  Macroeconomics  of  War 
and Peace* 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines  the effects  of government  purchases  on economic 
activity. Among  economists,  there is a basic agreement  about the effects 
of  increased  government  purchases.  A  transient  rise  in  government 
spending  increases  output,  drives up interest  rates, but crowds  out pri- 
vate  consumption  and  investment.  There are a variety  of theories  that 
are consistent  with  these  facts.  Competitive  models  described  by  Hall 
(1980); Barro (1981); or  Aiyagari,  Christiano,  and  Eichenbaum  (1992) 
predict  these  responses  as do the imperfectly  competitive  models  con- 
sidered  by Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1991, 1992). Other predictions  of 
these  competing  explanations  are at odds.  Competitive  models  predict 
that the  real wage  should  fall because  of the  negative  wealth  effect  of 
higher  tax liabilities.  Imperfectly  competitive  models  predict  that  real 
wages  ought  to rise. 
Isolating  the  effects  of government  policy  on  gross  national  product 
and the labor market is generally  difficult because  of problems  of simul- 
taneity.  But these  problems  may be resolved  if the policy  is sufficiently 
large to dominate  other events.  The two largest examples  of government 
demand  shocks  in this century  are the two  world  wars.  At the peak of 
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World War I, U.S.  military expenditures  absorbed  about  16 percent  of 
GNP  and  military  outlays  in  Great  Britain absorbed  close  to  40% of 
GDP.  World  War  II resulted  in  even  higher  expenditures  with  U.S. 
military outlays  absorbing  about  40% of GNP,  and  British military ex- 
penditures  absorbing about 50% of GDP. Events of this magnitude  offer 
an  interesting  laboratory for establishing  the  facts about  the  effects  of 
government  purchases  on economic  activity and evaluating  the plausi- 
bility of competing  economic  theories. 
In the first part of this investigation,  we  document  some  of the basic 
facts about the United  States and Great Britain. For both wars and both 
countries,  we  find  that  output  rises  and  private  investment  and  con- 
sumption  are  crowded  out.  We  also  find  evidence  of  significant  in- 
creases  in  government  investment  in  fixed  capital  in  both  countries. 
During  World  War I,  the  British government  financed  expansions  to 
critical manufacturing  industries  such  as  steel.  In  the  United  States, 
the  government  invested  significant  resources  in the  construction  of a 
merchant  marine.  Government  investment  played  an even  larger role 
during  World War II. In the  United  States,  if government-owned,  pri- 
vately  operated  (GOPO)  capital  is  added  to  the  private  capital  stock, 
the total stock of capital increases  during  the war.1 
Properly accounting  for GOPO capital has a large effect on total factor 
productivity  growth  during  the war.  If GOPO  capital is ignored,  total 
factor productivity  increases  at annual  rates  of  4% per  year  between 
1941 and 1944. Once GOPO capital is included  in the capital stock, total 
factor productivity  growth  falls to 2.7% per year.  After accounting  for 
changes  in  utilization,  we  find  that  total  factor productivity  grows  at 
2% per year during  the war. 
In addition  to the components  of output,  we  report the responses  of 
labor input  and labor productivity  for the two  countries.  In the United 
States,  labor input  increases  during both wars.  In Great Britain, on the 
other hand,  the  evidence  suggests  that labor input  falls. In both coun- 
tries, we  find labor productivity  increasing  during the wars.  The British 
experience  of  declining  labor  input  and  private  investment  at a time 
when  output  is increasing  poses  difficulties  for both  perfectly  and  im- 
perfectly  competitive  models.  In both  frameworks,  an increase  in gov- 
ernment  purchases  today  requires  an increase  in labor input  if output 
is to increase today.  Thus,  in terms of their prediction  for labor produc- 
tivity during  periods  of high  military expenditures,  both  theories  fail. 
These features  of the data may be reconciled  with theory if the effects 
of  conscription  and  government  investment  are  explicitly  modeled. 
1. Gordon (1969)  has estimated that the inclusion of GOPO capital results in a 30%  in- 
crease in manufacturing  capital  stock between 1940  and 1945. Macroeconomics  of War and Peace - 199 
Conscription  shifts  the  labor  supply  schedule  left,  thereby  increasing 
labor  productivity.  Government  investment  shifts  the  labor  demand 
schedule  right  in times  of high  government  spending.  With a shift  in 
the labor demand  schedule,  it is possible  to explain the fact that produc- 
tivity rises in the United  States during the wars as labor input increases. 
With conscription  and government  investment  rising together,  it is also 
possible  to explain  the British observation  of increasing  output  in times 
when  labor input  is declining. 
In the second  part of our investigation,  we ask the following  question: 
Can a plausibly  parameterized  specification  of preferences  and technol- 
ogy  deliver  the U.S.  and British observations?  We consider  a specifica- 
tion  where  government  capital  is  an  argument  of  the  production 
technology.  The  production  technology  is  assumed  to be  constant  re- 
turns  to  scale  in  private  capital,  government  capital,  and  labor input. 
Based  on  our  finding  that  total  factor productivity  growth  was  about 
average  during  the  war,  we  abstract entirely  from  fluctuations  in  the 
state of technology.  Instead we focus on the effects of government  activ- 
ity. A Markov process  is fit to data on government  investment,  military 
expenditures,  and  military employment.  This process  is used  to simu- 
late  wars.  We  compute  optimal  decision  functions  for  agents  in  the 
model  and  study  their response  to  shocks  of the  magnitude  of World 
War II. 
We find that our simple framework does  surprisingly well.  The model 
captures  a significant  fraction of the  movement  of hours  of work,  pro- 
ductivity,  and the components  of GNP.  We also find a positive  correla- 
tion  between  productivity  and  government  expenditures  even  when 
public  and  private  capital  are  perfect  substitutes  in  production.  The 
rise in productivity  comes  one  period after the increase in expenditures 
because  the  capital stock  takes  one  period  to adjust.  Finally,  we  show 
that  observations  in  Great Britain can be  explained  by  including  con- 
scription in the model. 
The remainder  of the  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2 of the 
paper  documents  the  U.S.  and  British wartime  experiences.  We focus 
on  GNP  and  its  components,  the  labor  market,  prices,  and  financial 
markets.  In Section  3,  we  describe  a simple  model  that takes  into  ac- 
count  government-owned  privately  operated  capital. We relate the pre- 
dictions  of  the  model  to  the  U.S.  and  British  data.  We  conclude  in 
Section  4. 
2.  The Data 
In this  section,  we  describe  the  effects  of World Wars I and  II on  eco- 
nomic  activity  in  Great Britain and  the  United  States.  We  discuss  the 200  ?  BRAUN & MCGRATTAN 
response  of  GNP  and  its  components,  the  labor  market,  prices,  and 
financial  markets  in the  two  countries.  At the  end  of each  section,  we 
summarize  the main findings. 
2.1 GREAT  BRITAIN'S  ECONOMY  DURING  WORLD  WAR  I 
Great  Britain on  the  eve  of  World  War I had  just  passed  through  a 
period of prosperity.  Unemployment,  which  was about 2%, was low by 
historical  standards.  With  the  Balkan war  having  been  settled  in  the 
previous  year,  financial  markets  were  calm  and  showed  no  evidence 
that war was  anticipated.  For instance,  the  assassination  of Archduke 
Ferdinand  in June 1914 was  interpreted  in early July as having  had no 
effect on financial markets  (Noyes,  1926, p.  54). Less than three weeks 
later,  international  markets  were  in  a  state  of  total  collapse.  On  July 
28, Austria  declared  war on Serbia. Three days  later, Germany  sent  its 
ultimatum  to France and  Russia.  On  the  same  day,  the  London  Stock 
Exchange  closed  for  the  first  time  ever  in  its  history.  The  U.S.  stock 
market suspended  operations  the same  day. 
The scale of the British war effort produced  unprecedented  demands 
on  industry  and  the workforce,  which  led to rapid price increases.  Be- 
tween  1914 and 1918, commodity  prices rose by over 100%. Early exam- 
ples  of profiteering  led  to the  use  of price controls,  which  by  the  end 
of the war covered  "nearly everything  that men could eat or drink with- 
out being  poisoned"  (Hancock and Gowing,  1949, p. 21). Price controls 
produced  shortages  that  led  the  British to  organize  an administrative 
framework  for systematically  rationing  food  items.  Although  rationing 
was  not imposed  until the later stages  of the war, lessons  were learned 
that significantly  facilitated the use  of rationing in World War II. 
During  World War I, the  British government  made  its first effort to 
control  production  systematically.  Shortages  of  strategic  materials  led 
the government  to restrict their export and requisition  domestic  stocks. 
The  government  imposed  price  controls  on  many  intermediate  goods 
and often  directly controlled  the allocation of these  goods.  The govern- 
ment  also helped  finance  expansions  to war-related industries. 
2.1.1  British GDP and its Components  in World War I  In the upper  panel 
of Figure 1, we plot the expenditure  shares of the components  of British 
GDP. The data that runs from 1910 to 1965 is taken from Mitchell (1988). 
From these  diagrams,  we  see  that the  share  of government  purchases 
rose  from less  than  10% of GDP to a maximum  of about 36% of GDP 
during  World War I. This rapid transient  rise in the  size  and  scope  of 
government  activities is rivaled only by the events  of World War II. The 
increase  in government  demand  was  accompanied  by both an increase Macroeconomics  of War and Peace * 201 
Figure 1 EXPENDITURE COMPONENTS  OF OUTPUT IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND  THE UNITED STATES. 
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in  output  and  declines  in  private  consumption  and  investment.  Real 
GDP rose by 17% between  1913 and 1917, reaching levels  that it did not 
exceed  again  for 20 years.  The share  of investment  in output  declined 
one  half over the same  period,  and consumption's  share in GDP fell by 
20%. There were  also large changes  in the composition  of consumption 
during  the  war.  For instance,  consumption  of food  items  fell by  only 
3% between  1916 and  1917, while  consumption  of household  durables 
declined  by 20% (Mitchell,  1988). Finally, the war had significant effects 
on net exports.  Between  1913 and  1917, net exports fell sharply as Brit- 
ain increased  imports  of foodstuffs  and other materials required for the 
war. 
The demands  of the war produced  major changes  in the composition 
of government  purchases.  Large fractions of the government's  expendi- 
ture were  used  to purchase  weaponry  and  to compensate  and  sustain 
military personnel.  Evidence  from the History  of the Ministry of Muni- 
tions  indicates  that  the  government  also  played  an  important  role  in 
expanding  productive  capacity during  the war. The British steel indus- 
try illustrates this point. At the outset of the war, the British government 
encouraged  the  steel  industry  to privately  finance  expansions  in capac- 
ity. These  appeals  were  successful  early in 1915 but soon  thereafter met 
with  resistance.  Producers  pointed  to  uncertainties  in  the  market  for 
steel  after the war and argued  that the excess  profits tax would  make it 
impossible  for them to achieve  a reasonable  return on their investment. 
After a series  of negotiations  in March 1916, the government  settled  on 
a formula for assistance  that called for the producers  to pay a minimum 
of 25% of the total cost of expansions  to capacity (History of the Munitions 
Ministry,  vol.  7,  p.  58).  By  the  end  of  the  war,  the  government  had 
provided  financial assistance  to 365 projects to expand  steel production. 
The government's  assistance  of 23.4 million  pounds  amounted  to 52% 
of the total cost of these  projects. 
The government  also played  a significant  role in financing  the devel- 
opment  of  a domestic  optical  glass  industry,  the  domestic  production 
of tungsten,  and the expansion  of copper  production. 
2.1.2  The British Labor  Market in  World War I  The  British war  effort 
required a large increase  in work effort at the same time that significant 
fractions of the work force were  being  drawn into the military. Panel A 
of Table 1 summarizes  the  effects  of these  competing  demands  on  the 
labor market.  Notice  first that  the  size  of  the  military increased  from 
400,000  in  1913 to over 4.4  million  in  1918. This buildup  in the  size  of 
the military is even  more remarkable given  that the unemployment  rate 
of 2.1% was  at a historically  low  level  (Mitchell,  1980). During the war, 
unemployment  dropped  to a low  of 0.4% in 1916. The figures  in Table Macroeconomics  of War  and  Peace  *  203 
1 show  steady  declines  in civilian employment  throughout  the duration 
of  the  war.  By 1918 civilian  employment  had  fallen by  over  2 million 
from its  peacetime  level  of  19 million  in  1913. This  decline  in civilian 
employment  was  accompanied  by large changes  in the composition  of 
employment.  Data in Mitchell  (1988) on union  membership  show  total 
membership  rising  by more  than  50% between  1913 and  1918. Female 
membership  rose by 179%. After the war both civilian employment  and 
the  unemployment  rate rose  as  the  size  of  the  military was  reduced. 
Female  participation  in the work force as measured  by union  member- 
ships  remained  high  through  1920 and  then  declined,  leveling  off  at 
about twice  its prewar level. 
Data on hours worked  is sketchy.  Maddison  (1989) reports that aver- 
age  hours  per year in Britain in 1913 were  2,624,  while  Mitchell  (1988) 
reports average annual hours were 2,753 in the same year. These figures 
suggest  that average  hours  per week  were  somewhere  between  53 and 
56 on the eve  of World War I. Bowley  (1921) reports that weekly  hours 
were  reduced  in  1919 by  an  average  of  6.5  hours.  If one  uses  prewar 
hours,  this  reduction  implies  postwar  work  weeks  between  46 and 48 
hours.  While  direct  measurements  of  hours  worked  are not  available 
during  the  war,  days  lost  to labor disputes  fell sharply,  and  anecdotal 
evidence  points  to an increased  use  of part-time employees,  significant 
flows  of labor from the agricultural sector to manufacturing,  and exten- 
sive  use  of  overtime.  However,  it appears  unlikely  that  these  factors 
could  have  produced  a rise in total civilian hours  during the war. If we 
assume  that  weekly  hours  were  53 and  multiply  this  estimate  by  the 
1913 civilian  employment  figure  in Table  1,  then  total weekly  civilian 
hours  in  1913 are about  1 billion.  In order for weekly  civilian hours  to 
maintain  this level  in 1918, per capita weekly  hours would  have had to 
increase by 9 hours.2 An increase  of this magnitude  seems  implausible. 
By way  of  comparison,  in  World  War II, weekly  hours  increased  by 
only  about  3  hours  per  week.  Moreover,  in  World  War II, workers 
started from a lower  base  of 46.5 hours  per week. 
The difficulties  in measuring  labor input  during  World War I clearly 
affect  our  ability  to  measure  labor's  productivity.  Feinstein  (1972) re- 
ports output  per worker using  total employment  (civilian and military), 
and  his  compromise  factor cost measure  of real GDP. This measure  of 
labor productivity,  which  is reported  in Table 1, rises by a total of 7% 
between  1913 and  1918. 
Real wages  during  World War I decline  between  1915 and  1917 and 
then  recover  in  1918,  with  net  gains  in  real wages  in  1919 and  1920. 
Bowley  (1921, pp.  105-106)  reports indices  for a number of occupations 
2. This calculation  holds  fixed  the number  of weeks  worked  per year. Table 1  EMPLOYMENT, PRODUCTIVITY AND  WAGES IN GREAT BRITAIN DURING  WORLD WAR I AND 
WORLD WAR II 
A.  World War I 
Civilian  Output per 
employmenta  Armed forcesb  Unemployment'  workerd  Real wagese 
Year  (thousands)  (thousands)  (%)  (1913  =  100)  (1913  =  100) 
1913  19,910  400  2.1  100  100 
1914  19,440  810  3.3  101  100 
1915  18,400  2,490  1.1  106  89 
1916  17,700  3,500  .4  107  83 
1917  17,100  4,250  .6  107  80 
1918  17,060  4,430  .8  107  90 
1919  19,030  2,130  3.4  97  102 
1920  20,810  760  2.0  92  105 B. World War II 
Civilian  Output per 
employmenta  Armed forcesb  Average  workerd  Real wagese 
Year  (thousands)  (thousands)  weekly hoursf  (1938  =  100)  (1938  =  100) 
1938  20,986  432  46.5  100  100 
1939  21,800  480  -97  98 
1940  20,800  2,270  -  103  96 
1941  20,600  3,380  -108  95 
1942  20,700  4,090  -  108  95 
1943  20,200  4,780  50.0  109  97 
1944  19,700  4,990  48.6  106  99 
1945  19,100  5,130  47.4  103  102 
aTotal  civilian  employment from Feinstein  (1972,  p. T126). 
bArmed  forces from Feinstein (1972,  p. T126). 
cPercentage  unemployed from Feinstein  (1972,  p. T126). 
dThe  ratio  of real GDP from Feinstein  (1972)  to civilian  employment plus armed  forces expressed as an index. 
'Index of weekly wage rates from Feinstein  (1972, p. T140)  divided by the Ministry  of Labour  Gazette index of retail  prices, also from Feinstein (1972, p. 
T140). 
fAverage  weekly hours, Hancock  (1951,  p. 204). 206 *  BRAUN  & MCGRATTAN 
ranging  from bricklayers  to engineering  artisans.  If we  use  his  cost  of 
living  index,  increases  in wage  rates in  1918 offset  the  declines  in the 
earlier  years.  Table  1 reports  an  index  of  real  wages  from  Feinstein 
(1972).  In  constructing  this  index,  nominal  wage  rates  were  deflated 
by  the  Labour Gazette  cost  of  living  index.  Bowley  (1921, pp.  63-75) 
documents  several  factors that lead  this index  to overstate  increases  in 
the cost of living  during  World War I. But the basic pattern of declines 
in 1915-1917  with  subsequent  rises from 1918 to 1920 is similar for both 
measures  of real wages. 
2.1.3  Prices in Britain During World War I  Prices increased  at unprece- 
dented  rates  during  World  War I. The  Labour Gazette  index  rose  by 
110% between  1914 and  1918. The Bowley  index  rose by 85% over the 
same interval.  Mitchell  (1919) reports even  faster growth  in commodity 
prices. Between  1914 and 1918, Mitchell's index of 150 commodity  prices 
increased  by 140%. 
Incidents  of  hoarding  and  profiteering  led  the  government  to  take 
direct control of key industries  and impose  price controls on many inter- 
mediate  and final goods.  These controls often took the form of cost plus 
formulas,  which  meant  that production  costs  had  to be calculated  and 
reasonable  markup margins  determined.  Excess profits taxes were  also 
adopted  that  limited  the  gains  from  profiteering,  but  also  dampened 
investment  incentives. 
Food  supplies  in Great Britain were  not seriously  affected until 1917. 
Price controls  were  first implemented  on  food  items  in the  summer  of 
1917. However,  it was  not  until  food  shortages  arose in late  1917 and 
early  1918 that rationing  was  extended  to items  other  than  sugar.  Ini- 
tially, consumers  were required to register with a particular retailer who 
then  became  the  consumer's  sole  supplier  of  rationed  items.  Ration 
coupons  were  added  to this registration requirement  between  February 
and  July.  These  programs  were  largely  successful  in  eliminating  the 
queuing  that had  occurred in late 1917 for items  like butter and meat. 
Shortages  of skilled labor produced  bidding  contests  among  employ- 
ers at the  start of the  war.  To control  the  upward  pressure  on wages, 
the Munitions  Control Act of 1915 included  a Code of Labour Regulation 
that prohibited  workers  from accepting  new  employment  without  writ- 
ten permission  from their current employer.  However,  the Code of La- 
bour Regulation  provoked  widespread  resentment  among  workers and 
was  abandoned  in August  of 1917. 
2.1.4  Financial  Markets in Britain During World War I  The rapid inflation 
during World War I had a significant effect on real interest rates. Homer Macroeconomics  of War and Peace ? 207 
and Sylla (1991) report that nominal  yields  on consols  rose steadily  dur- 
ing the war from 3.46% in 1914 to 4.62% in 1919. Similarly, government 
issues  rose  from  3.96% in  1914 to  about  6% in  1920.  However,  these 
increases  in  nominal  yields  were  small  relative  to  the  price  increases 
documented  earlier. After accounting  for the effects of inflation,  ex post 
returns are negative  for the duration  of the war. 
2.2 THE  UNITED  STATES  ECONOMY  DURING  WORLD  WAR I 
The  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe  caused  financial  panic  in  the  United 
States.  The  U.S.  stock  market suspended  operations  on July 31,  1914, 
to avoid  facing an onslaught  of panic sell orders from Europe.  Expecta- 
tions  that  trade  flows  would  be  disrupted  produced  steep  declines  in 
commodity  prices for cotton and wheat.  The prices of many other traded 
goods  like  copper,  steel,  meat,  and  oil  fell  as well.  In contrast  to  the 
Europeans  who  placed  embargoes  on exports of gold at the outbreak of 
war,  the  United  States  continued  to  honor  its  gold  obligations.  The 
initial panic in the United  States subsided  rapidly as it became clear that 
the war would  increase  demand  for many U.S.  goods.  After the United 
States  entered  the  war  in  April  1917,  further  disruptions  occurred  as 
the country mobilized  for war. The Armistice was  signed  on November 
11, 1918, nineteen  months  after the United States' entry into the conflict. 
2.2.1  U.S. GNP and its Components  During World War  I  The U.S.  experi- 
ence  in World War I was  similar to the  British experience  in many  re- 
spects.  The lower plot in Figure 1 displays  the shares of the expenditure 
components  of  GNP.  As  in  Britain,  World  War  I  produced  major 
changes  in the composition  of output.  While the magnitude  of the U.S. 
war effort was much  smaller than in Britain, the pattern of responses  of 
consumption  and investment  were quite similar. Increased government 
spending  acted to crowd  out private consumption  and investment.  Net 
exports,  which  were  negative  in 1913, rose rapidly after the outbreak of 
hostilities  and peaked  at 6% of GNP in 1916. 
In the  course  of the  war,  the  U.S.  government  devoted  a small,  but 
significant,  fraction  of its  expenditures  to  activities  that expanded  the 
country's  productive  capacity.  The disruption  of trade flows  in Europe 
and the neutrality of the United  States created a demand  for U.S.  goods 
that quickly absorbed the resources  of the entire U.S. merchant shipping 
fleet. To help meet the shortage of merchant shipping,  the United States 
Shipping  Board was established.  The goal of this government  enterprise 
was  to provide  a supply  of merchant  vessels  that could  support  naval 
forces  in  the  case  of  war  and  facilitate  foreign  commerce  with  other 
neutral  countries.  By the  end  of the  war,  the  government  had  signed 208 ?  BRAUN  & MCGRATTAN 
contracts  to  build  3,116  freighters  with  a  deadweight  tonnage 
of  16,914,047  tons.  This  was  equal  to  one  third  of  the  world  mer- 
chant  tonnage  in  1913  (Crowell,  1920).  As  of  December  31,  1918, 
$2,769,337,500  had  been  authorized  for  ship  construction  under  this 
program.  This amount  was  twice  the  navy's  ship  building  budget  and 
about  4% of GNP  in  1918. The U.S.  government  made  further invest- 
ments  in munitions  and industrial plants of about $600 million,  and sold 
$2.2 billion of trucks and buses  (original cost) after the war (Cook, 1948). 
2.2.2  The U.S.  Labor  Market During  World War I  Panel  A  of  Table 2 
contains  information  on aggregate  labor market statistics for the United 
States  during  World  War I.  Consider  the  patterns  in  civilian  employ- 
ment.  Kendrick's  measure  of  persons  engaged  increases  from  1914 
through  1917  and  then  declines  in  1918,  the  year  that  conscription 
reached  its  peak.  This pattern  is different  from Britain, where  civilian 
employment  dropped  steadily  throughout  the  entire  war.  One  reason 
for this difference  is the smaller migration of manpower  into the armed 
services.  At  their  peak  the  U.S.  armed  forces  were  only  65% of  the 
size  of  the  British forces.  Table 2 also  contains  Kendrick's measure  of 
man-hours  divided  by the population  over  16. This measure  shows  an 
increase in labor input during World War I. Kendrick's measure of labor 
productivity  is listed in column  five.  Labor productivity  declines  in 1917 
and  then  recovers  in  1918.  Once  trend  growth  is  taken  into  account, 
these  data  show  no  strong  pattern  in labor productivity  during  World 
War I. Finally,  note  that  real wages  are basically  constant  until  1917, 
and then  increase  in 1918-1920. 
2.2.3  Prices in the U.S.  During World War I  The evolution  of prices in 
the  United  States  during  the  war  is  similar to  patterns  already  docu- 
mented  in  Britain. Between  1913 and  1918, the  CPI increased  by  57% 
and by 1920 prices had risen by 133%. These increases are on a compara- 
ble scale with  the British experience,  although  U.S.  prices started rising 
somewhat  later than in Britain. Commodity  prices in the United  States 
also closely  mimic the evolution  of British prices for comparable items. 
Commodity  prices rose by 110% between  1913 and  1918. In both coun- 
tries the  sharpest  increases  in commodity  prices  occurred in  1916 and 
1917 and  then  stabilized  in  1918 as  government  price  controls  were 
extended. 
Price controls  were  put into effect  shortly  after the United  States en- 
tered the war in response  to rapidly escalating  prices. For instance,  steel 
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prices  rose  by  28% over  the  same  period  (see  Mitchell,  1919).  Price 
controls on food were effected by licensing  requirements.  Licenses were 
required for merchants  who  imported,  manufactured,  stored,  or distrib- 
uted  specific  items.  Farmers, gardeners,  and small businesses  were  ex- 
empted.  Penalties  were  set for hoarding  goods,  destroying  goods  with 
the intent to drive up prices,  or making excessive  profits. Violators were 
subject  to  fines  ranging  from  $5 to  $10,000,  the  revocation  of  their li- 
censes,  and jail sentences  for serious violations  (Mitchell, 1919). In prac- 
tice  prices  were  not  directly  fixed:  Rather  markups  were  limited  by 
"reasonable margin-of-profit" rules. Reasonable profit margins were ini- 
tially based  on  prewar  profit margins,  but,  as the  war  advanced,  this 
was  replaced  by  a two-tier  system  with  distinct  margins  for high-cost 
and low-cost  dealers.  While price controls led to shortages  of some items 
(e.g.,  sugar),  a formal system  of rationing  was  not used  for consumer 
items  in  World  War I.  Instead  the  government  relied  on  appeals  to 
dealers to limit sales to each customer  of items in short supply  (Rockoff, 
1984). 
Wage  controls  were  not  applied  in  the  United  States  during  World 
War I. Instead  the government  took an active role in matching  workers 
with  employers  and  mediating  labor disputes.  In a few  rare instances, 
the government  seized  key industries  where labor problems were partic- 
ularly acute.  The most  notable  example  was  Smith and Wesson.  Labor 
disputes  also  played  a role  in  the  government's  decision  to  take over 
the railroads. 
Taken  together  these  measures  were  largely  successful  in  bringing 
inflation  under  control by the beginning  of 1918 (Rockoff, 1984, p. 69). 
2.2.4  U.S.  Financial Markets During World War I  One  result  of war in 
Europe  was  that New  York assumed  London's  position  as the leading 
center  of international  finance.  European  powers  floated  large loans  in 
the  United  States  during  the  war,  and by the war's  end  nearly half of 
the  world's  gold  reserves  were  located  in the United  States.  In the pe- 
riod  from  1915 to  1917,  (nominal)  yields  on  bonds  tended  to  decline 
(Homer and Sylla,  1991). However,  the U.S.  entry into war produced  a 
decline  in  the bond  market.  Yields  on  prime  corporate debt  rose  from 
3.98  to  4.98% between  January and  October  1917.  Commercial  paper 
rates rose from 3.84% in 1916 to 5.07% in 1917. Yields on Liberty govern- 
ment  bonds,  which  were  tax exempt,  rose  quickly  after their issue  at 
3.5% to 3.61%. These  yields  appear to be low given  the rapid escalation 
of  prices  during  this  period.  Ex post  real  rates  on  commercial  paper 
were  negative  between  1915 and 1917 and in 1919. Table 2  EMPLOYMENT, HOURS,  PRODUCTIVITY, AND  WAGES IN THE U.S.  DURING  WORLD WAR I AND 
WORLD WAR II 
A.  World War I 
Persons  Armed  Man-hours  Labor  Real wages in 
engageda  forcesb  per capitac  productivityd  manufacturinge 
Year  (thousands)  (thousands)  (1913  =  100)  (1913  =  100)  (1913  =  100) 
1913  36,285  155  100  100  100 
1914  35,787  166  96  93  100 
1915  35,916  174  94  97  99 
1916  38,332  179  99  104  102 
1917  39,004  644  100  99  99 
1918  38,938  2,897  98  107  103 
1919  38,990  1,173  94  114  107 
1920  39,183  343  95  113  115 B.  World War II 
Persons  Armed  Man-hours  Labor  Real wages in 
engageda  forcesb  per capitac  productivityd  manufacturinge 
Year  (thousands)  (thousands)  (1941  =  100)  (1941  =  100)  (1941  =  100) 
1938  40,718  323  88  89  88 
1939  42,139  334  91  92  89 
1940  43,874  458  93  95  90 
1941  47,349  1,801  100  100  100 
1942  49,885  3,859  107  100  112 
1943  50,656  9,045  109  102  124 
1944  49,513  11,452  106  108  128 
1945  47,994  12,123  99  114  128 
aKendrick's  measure  of persons engaged as reported  in Long  Term  Economic  Growth  (1973,  p. 194). 
bArmed forces  from Historical Statistics of the U.S.,  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  (1975, p.  1141). 
'Kendrick's  total private man-hours  as reported  in Long  Term  Economic  Growth  (1973)  divided by population  over 16. 
dKendrick's  index of output per man-hour  as reported  in Long  Term  Economic  Growth  (1973). 
eReal  wages in manufacturing  defined as the ratio of average hourly earnings in manufacturing  from Historical  Statistics  of the U.S. (1975, p. 168)  divided 
by the CPI  all items same source, p. 211. 212 . BRAUN  & MCGRATTAN 
2.3 A COMPARISON  OF U.S. AND BRITISH  EXPERIENCES  IN WORLD 
WAR I 
Our analysis  of  the  British and  U.S.  economies  shows  three  common 
features  during  World War I. First, the  response  of the  major compo- 
nents  of output  was  the same  in both countries.  The increased  govern- 
ment  demand  for  goods  raised  output  and  crowded  out  private 
consumption  and investment  in both countries.  Second,  significant frac- 
tions of government  purchases  were used to expand productive  capacity 
during  the war.  For example,  in Great Britain, the government  helped 
finance  expansions  to the steel  industry.  In the United  States,  the gov- 
ernment  took  a  lead  role  in  expanding  the  merchant  marine.  Third, 
labor productivity  increased  in both  countries.  In Great Britain, output 
per worker rose, and the available evidence  points to increases in output 
per  man-hour  as  well.  In the  United  States,  labor productivity  fell  in 
1917 and then  recovered  in 1918. 
The  most  striking  difference  between  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain was  in  the  response  of  employment.  In Great Britain, civilian 
employment  fell steadily  throughout  the war. In the United States, civil- 
ian  employment  was  steady  in  1917 and  1918. This difference  is most 
likely due  to the fact that Great Britain lost a much larger fraction of its 
labor force to the armed forces. 
2.4 GREAT  BRITAIN'S  ECONOMY  DURING  WORLD  WAR  II 
The  British government's  actions  in  World War II were  heavily  influ- 
enced  by  its  experience  in  World  War I.  For instance,  rationing  was 
widely  viewed  as  having  been  successful  in  ending  the  queues  that 
formed  in  the  winter  of  1917-1918.  Thus,  when  war broke out  again, 
rationing  of food  items  was  quickly  reinstated.  Wage  controls,  on  the 
other  hand,  were  considered  to  have  been  a failure  and,  thus,  were 
not  used  in World War II. The experience  of the  First World War also 
influenced  firms' actions.  The severe recession  that followed  World War 
I penalized  many  of the firms that had responded  to the government's 
pleas  by expanding  capacity with  their internal funds.  As a result,  the 
British government  was  compelled  to finance a substantially  larger frac- 
tion of the expansions  to productive  capacity in World War II. 
2.4.1  British GDP and its Components  During World War II  The scale of 
the  "Great War" was  dwarfed  within  25 years by World War II. Figure 
1 shows  that  at its  peak,  government  purchases  accounted  for nearly 
half  of  Britain's  GDP.  This  massive  increase  in  government  demand 
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I. Consumption  fell to levels  not  seen  in ten years.  As in World War I, 
the  decline  in  durable  consumption  was  large.  Real expenditures  on 
household  durable goods  fell by 74% between  1939 and 1944, while  real 
food expenditures  fell by 13% (Hancock,  1951, p. 203). Net imports also 
surpassed  levels  in the  first war,  reaching  a maximum  of 13% of GDP 
in 1940, the year before  the Lend-Lease  Program began. 
One  of  the  more  important  distinctions  between  World War II and 
World  War I is  the  increased  importance  of  government  assistance  in 
financing  investment.  In the Second  World War, firms were  again will- 
ing  to  fund  expansion  of  their  facilities.  With  excess  profits  taxes  of 
100% and  government  regulation  of  prices,  private  operators  argued 
that the return from investing  in plant expansion  was  likely to be small 
or even  negative.  The steep  recession  that followed  the First World War 
provided  additional  fuel for their arguments. 
The government's  investment  in fixed capital fell into three categories: 
direct  assistance  to  firms,  investment  in  government  agency  projects 
that  were  government-owned  but  privately  operated,  and  investment 
in government-owned,  government-operated  facilities.  In cases  where 
the government's  needs  could be met by expanding  current facilities, it 
offered  assistance  in  financing  the  project.  This  assistance  had  two 
forms: contributory  schemes  and 100% government  financing.  For con- 
tributory schemes,  the government  would  offer to pay up to 60% of the 
cost  of the  project.  Title of the  project was  given  to the  firm, and  the 
firm paid  rent  on  the  government's  share  of  the  investment  ranging 
from 4% to 6% per annum  for the course  of the war. Under the second 
form of assistance,  the  government  contributed  100% of the  costs  and 
retained  title  to  the  project.  In addition,  the  government  limited  the 
firm's  return  on  the  government-owned  capital  to  an  average  of  2% 
although  rates of return varied  widely  (Ashworth,  1953, ch.  12). Gov- 
ernment  investment  in government  agencies  typically involved  the con- 
struction  of  new  plants.  Private  operators  were  then  contracted  to 
manage the operation  of these facilities. The smallest of the three catego- 
ries,  government-owned,  government-operated  facilities,  typically con- 
sisted  of  armaments  factories,  many  of  which  had  been  built  during 
World War I. 
Total government  investment  in fixed capital amounted  to 1.2 billion 
pounds  between  1937 and  1945. Of this  total,  50% fell in the  category 
of government  assistance  to private  firms,  25% went  to agencies,  and 
the remaining  25% was for government  operations.  Government  expen- 
ditures on fixed capital were  over 3% of GDP in 1940 and 1941 and then 
declined  to  about  1% of  GDP after the  United  States  entered  the  war 
(Ashworth,  1953, pp.  252-253). 214  .  BRAUN & MCGRATTAN 
2.4.2  The British Labor Market During  World War II  The  British labor 
market in World War II bears  many  resemblances  to the  labor market 
in World War I. Panel  B of Table 1 reports basic labor market statistics 
for the  period  1938 through  1945. As  in World War I, civilian employ- 
ment  fell  steadily  throughout  the  entire  war  period.  Unemployment 
rates fell to the  same  levels  observed  in World War I. The availability 
of  data  on  hours  during  World  War II is  only  slightly  better  than  for 
World  War I.  Hancock  (1951) reports  that  average  weekly  hours  in- 
creased from 46.5 in the last quarter of 1938 to a maximum of 50 in 1943. 
Given  the  measured  decline  in employment  between  1939 and  1945, it 
appears unlikely  that man-hours  increased  significantly  during the war. 
Finally,  note  that real wages  and output  per worker moved  in oppo- 
site directions  during  the war. Feinstein's  (1972) measure  of output  per 
worker shows  an initial dip in 1939, followed  by increases through  1943. 
Real wages,  on  the  other hand,  declined  from 1939 until  1942 and  did 
not exceed  their prewar level  until  1945. 
2.4.3  Prices in Great Britain During World War II  Price increases  during 
World  War II were  more  moderate  than  in  World War I. The  Labour 
Gazette's  cost-of-living  index  increased  by 43% between  1939 and 1945, 
which  was  less  than half of the increase  observed  in World War I. The 
smaller  growth  in  prices  during  World  War II reflects  the  success  of 
government  price  control  and  rationing  programs.  Responsibility  for 
price controls  on  consumer  goods  was  divided  between  two  agencies: 
the Ministry of Food and the Board of Trade. The Ministry of Food was 
given  exclusive  control over food imports and used  this authority,  e.g., 
to purchase  virtually the entire  sugar crop produced  in the British Em- 
pire in 1939. The Ministry of Food also was responsible  for setting maxi- 
mum  prices for food  products  at the wholesale  and retail levels  and for 
rationing  staples  such  as  sugar  and  meat.  Rationing  was  imposed  on 
butter,  bacon,  sugar,  and  meat  shortly  after war was  declared.  As  the 
war  progressed,  piecemeal  rationing  of  particular items  was  replaced 
by  a point  system.  The  Ministry  of Food  also  subsized  items  ranging 
from  milk  to  meat  and  flour.  Controls  for  nonfood  consumer  goods 
were  the responsibility  of the Board of Trade. Price increases  were con- 
trolled by limiting markups to prewar levels  plus an additional  percent- 
age to cover their increased  costs.  Wages were  one of the few items not 
controlled.  On the basis  of its experience  with  labor market controls in 
World  War I,  the  government  decided  to  let  wage  differentials  draw 
laborers into  sectors  where  their services  were  needed  most. 
2.4.4 Financial  Markets  in Great  Britain During World  War  II  The outbreak 
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panic selling  that occurred in World War I. Stock market prices in Great 
Britain started falling in 1937, reaching  a low  point in June 1940 during 
the Dunkirk evacuation.  After the evacuation,  prices started a recovery 
that lasted until the end of the war. New  security issues  fell dramatically 
during  the  war  because  of  controls  imposed  by  the  government.  The 
yield  on consols  rose  from 2.65% in 1935 to a high  of 4.1% in 1939 and 
then  fell steadily  through  the  second  war,  falling to a low  of 2.51% in 
1946. The average yield  of bonds  of maturity 30 years or longer fell from 
a high  of 3.62% in  1939 to a low  of 2.53% in  1946. The bank rate was 
fixed  at 2% during  the war,  and  government  bonds  were  issued  at 3% 
(Homer  and Sylla,  1991). 
2.5 THE  UNITED  STATES  ECONOMY  DURING  WORLD  WAR  II 
The  United  States  declared  war  on  Japan and  Germany  on  December 
7,  1941. Preparations  for war,  however,  had begun  18 months  earlier. 
During  the  Second  World War, the  government  adopted  many  of the 
same  strategies  used  by  Britain. Price controls  were  widespread,  and 
government  mandates  curtailed  production  of  many  consumer  dura- 
bles.  Rationing  of food  items  was  introduced  in  1943. The marshaling 
of  resources  achieved  by  the  United  States  during  the  Second  World 
War is  unprecedented.  It  took  ten  years  for  real  GNP  to  exceed  its 
wartime  peak. 
2.5.1  U.S.  GNP and its Components During World War II  As  in World 
War I,  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  Europe  brought  an  initial  period 
of  prosperity  to  the  United  States.  Real GNP  grew  at  about  7% per 
year  in  1939 and  1940 before  it  started  accelerating  in  1941.  Between 
1941 and  1944,  real GNP  increased  by  52%. The  responses  of  aggre- 
gate  expenditures  shown  on  the  lower  plot  of  Figure  1 are  familiar: 
a  massive  increase  in  government  purchases  that  is  associated  with 
large increases  in GNP,  and  significant  crowding  out of private invest- 
ment. 
An  interesting  property  of  this  data  is  the  positive  growth  in  con- 
sumption  between  1943 and  1945. Real consumption  expenditures  fell 
between  1941 and 1942 and then  increased  during the remainder of the 
war.  There were  also large changes  in the composition  of consumption 
during  the war. In 1942 production  of automobiles  for nonmilitary  pur- 
poses  was  halted,  and production  of many other consumption  durables 
was  curtailed.  These  actions  produced  a large  decline  in  the  share  of 
durables  in total consumption. 
Government  purchases  also exhibited  significant compositional  shifts 
during  World War II. Before the  war,  government  purchases  of goods 
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federal purchases  in 1938. In 1938 durable goods  constituted  5% of fed- 
eral purchases  and structures  added  another  10%. The share of nondu- 
rables  was  9%.  By  1942  the  composition  of  purchases  had  shifted 
sharply  toward  durables  and  structures.  Durable goods  had risen by a 
factor of 8 and  accounted  for 24% of total purchases,  while  structures 
had risen by a factor of 12 and made up 17% of total purchases.  Spend- 
ing  on  durables  and  structures  started  rising  in  1940 as  the  country 
began  preparing  for the  possibility  of  war.  Nondurables  and  services 
rose  later  as  the  costs  of  raising  and  maintaining  the  armed  forces 
mounted.  Approximately  80% of the increase in the services component 
between  1938 and  1943 was  due to increases  in total wages  and salaries 
paid  to military employees.3 
One problem with the National  Income and Product Accounts  data on 
government  purchases  is that it fails to show  the uses  of the investment 
components.  During  World  War  II,  the  investment  component  was 
large. The federal government  financed large increases in industrial con- 
struction  and  producer's  equipment  that increased  the  productive  ca- 
pacity of the automotive,  aircraft, and aluminum  industries.  In addition, 
large fractions of the government's  investment  in fixed capital was used 
by private industry  after the war.  Gordon  (1969) estimates  that $12 bil- 
lion  (valued  at historical  cost)  worth  of  structures  and  equipment  fi- 
nanced  by the government  during the war was used by postwar private 
operators (see also Jaszi, 1970, and Gordon,  1970). For purposes  of com- 
parison,  total private investment  over the same period was $11.4 billion. 
Figure 2 shows  the  private  gross  manufacturing  stock of equipment 
and structures,  and the gross  stock of GOPO equipment  and structures 
from 1939 to 1954 expressed  in 1958 dollars.  The data is from Wasson, 
Musgrave,  and Harkins (1970). Note  that the inclusion  of GOPO capital 
provides  an  entirely  different  picture  of  the  war.  If GOPO  capital  is 
left out,  the  capital stock falls during  the war.  If government  capital is 
included,  then  the war is a period  in which  significant  additions  were 
made  to the country's  productive  capacity. 
Some  general  information  on  the  types  of investments  that the gov- 
ernment  undertook  are recorded  in the October 1944 issue  of Survey of 
Current Business. The Survey estimated  that 90% of magnesium  capacity, 
65% of aluminum  capacity,  20% of blast furnace  capacity,  and  10% of 
steel-making  furnaces  was  government  owned  at  that  point  in  time. 
Cook  (1948) and  Gordon  (1969) provide  more  details  on  the  nature  of 
projects  in which  the  government  invested.  Some  of the larger invest- 
3. These calculations are based on figures reported in The  National  Income  and Product 
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Figure  2 PRIVATELY  OWNED CAPITAL  AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED, 
PRIVATELY  OPERATED  CAPITAL  IN MANUFACTURING. 
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ments  include  $1.3 billion to expand  steel capacity, $3.8 billion in aircraft 
plants,  $704 million  in aluminum  plants,  and  $700 million  in synthetic 
rubber plants.  After the war, significant  amounts  of GOPO capital were 
sold to the private operators  at an average of 27% of the historical cost. 
However,  as Figure 2 illustrates,  GOPO capital continued  to constitute 
an  important  fraction  of  the  manufacturing  capital  stock  through  the 
postwar.4 
Correctly  accounting  for the  investment  component  of  government 
purchases  has a large effect on the properties  of Solow's  residual.  Table 
3 summarizes  the  average  growth  rate of  total  factor productivity  be- 
tween  1938 and  1947. Results  are reported  for three  subperiods,  1938- 
1941,  1941-1944,  and  1944-1947.  The  percentages  reported  in Table 3 
are total growth  for the subperiod.  The upper panel contains  results for 
the entire U.S.  economy.  In the upper panel,  output  is measured  using 
real GNP in 1982 dollars net of government  compensation  of employees. 
The measures  of labor input  and  capital are varied  as we  move  across 
4. Many  of these  facts have  been  documented  previously  by Gordon  (1969). 218  BRAUN  & MCGRATTAN 
Table 3  U.S. TOTAL  FACTOR  PRODUCTIVITY  DURING  WORLD  WAR  IPa 
Private  plus  Capacity 
Private  capital  GOPO  capital  utilization 
Subperiod  (percent)  (percent)  (percent) 
1938-1941  4.3  4.3  3.7 
1941-1944  4.0  2.5  1.8 
1944-1947  -1.2  -1.0  0 
aThe figures  in this table  are average  annual growth rates  in total factor  productivity. 
the  columns.  In column  one  labor input  is measured  using  Kendrick's 
(1961) index  of labor input in the private economy  and the capital stock 
using  data  on  the  stock  of  capital  of equipment  and  structures  for all 
industries  measured  in 1982 constant  dollars as reported in Fixed Repro- 
ducible Tangible Wealth in the United States (1987). Column  two  uses  the 
same  measure  of labor input  and augments  the capital stock to include 
GOPO capital as reported  in Wasson,  Musgrave,  and Harkins (1970). 
The third column  uses  private capital plus  GOPO capital to measure 
the  total capital stock and  makes  adjustments  for utilization  of capital. 
In Appendix  B we  describe  a  model  that  allows  for variation  in  the 
workweek  of  capital.  This  specification  yields  the  following  aggregate 
production  technology: 
Yt =  ktnt  l1-0)htzt, 
where  nt represents  the fraction of the population  employed,  ht is hours 
per worker,  kt is  the  capital  stock  (per capita),  Yt is per capita output, 
and Zt  is the technology  shock.  Results  in column  three use  Kendrick's 
(1961) measure  of private-sector employment  divided by civilian popula- 
tion over sixteen  from U.S.  Historical Statistics to measure  nt, and ht is 
constructed  by dividing  our previous  measure  of labor input by private- 
sector  employment.  The  variables  Yt and  kt are also  expressed  in  per 
capita terms.  In this representation  hours per worker indexes  the inten- 
sity of utilization  of the two  inputs:  capital and labor. Finally, note that 
all columns  assume  a capital share of 0  =  0.25.5 
Looking  first at the  period  from 1941 through  1944, we  observe  that 
the productivity  calculation in column  one suggests  that a large positive 
technology  shock  occurred  during  the  war.  Total  factor productivity 
growth  in  the  peacetime  averages  about 2% per year.  Subtracting this 
5. The capital share parameter value  here is lower than the values  used by Prescott (1986) 
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from the reported  growth  of 4.3% leaves  7% unexplained  between  1941 
and  1944.  In column  two  GOPO  capital is added  to the  capital stock. 
This  adjustment  reduces  total  factor productivity  growth  to  2.5% per 
year,  thereby  reducing  the  unexplained  growth  of 2% over  this  three- 
year period.  Once the effects of changes  in utilization  are accounted  for, 
productivity  growth  between  1941 and  1944 is  about  average  at 1.8% 
per annum. 
The nine  years  from 1938 to 1947 covers  the period between  the last 
prewar  trough  to  the  first  postwar  trough.  In  this  period,  if  GOPO 
capital is ignored,  total factor productivity  exhibits strong growth before 
the war and  slows  considerably  after the war.  Overall,  total factor pro- 
ductivity  increases  by  20% over  this  period  or about  2% above  trend. 
Accounting  for GOPO capital attenuates  the swings  in total factor pro- 
ductivity  and  reduces  the  growth  in  total factor productivity  over  the 
period  to  17% which  is slightly  below  trend.  Adjustments  for changes 
in  capacity  utilization  reduce  the  growth  during  this  period  further to 
16%. 
2.5.2  The U.S.  Labor  Market During World War II  A  second  important 
factor explaining  the  remarkable growth  in GNP  during  World War II 
was  growth  in labor input.  Panel B of Table 2 shows  some  of the main 
features of the labor market during the second war. Employment  started 
rising  as  Europe  began  to  prepare  for war  and  rose  further after war 
broke out  in 1939. One  of the  more remarkable features  of World War 
II was  the strong growth  in employment  after the United  States entered 
the  war.  Civilian  employment  continued  to  increase  steadily  through 
1943 even  as  armed  forces  were  increased  from  four  to  nine  million. 
The  changing  composition  of government  demand  is also  reflected  in 
more  disaggregated  labor market  statistics.  For instance,  employment 
in durable goods  manufacturing  increased  by over  150% between  1938 
and  1944,  while  employment  in  nondurable  manufacturing  increased 
by only  30%. 
Per capita man-hours  also grew  strongly,  increasing  by 9 percent be- 
tween  1941 and  1943.  While  some  of  this  growth  came  from  the  in- 
creases  in  employment  documented  earlier,  weekly  hours  increased 
significantly  as well.  The National  Industrial  Council  Board's index  of 
weekly  hours  increased  from 41.7 hours  per week  in July 1941 to 47.9 
hours per week  in July 1944. In some vital industries  like machine tools, 
the  average  workweek  increased  by  as much  as ten  hours  during  the 
war.6 
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Labor productivity  growth  is  not  very  strong  during  World War II. 
Kendrick's  measure  is essentially  flat in the  first two  years  of the  war 
and then increases.  If we  assume  average growth  of about 2% per year, 
Kendrick's measure  is below  trend in 1942 and 1943 and above trend in 
1944 and  1945.  It is  interesting  that  the  strongest  growth  in  average 
productivity  coincides  with  the  periods  when  conscription  rates reach 
their maximum. 
Finally, as Rotemburg and Woodford  (1992) have emphasized,  wages 
in manufacturing  increased  rapidly during  the Second  World War. Un- 
derlying  this  growth  was  a sharp  increase  in wages  in durable  goods 
industries.  In other  sectors  of the  economy,  wage  rates fell.  Bry (1961, 
p. 316), for instance,  reports steady declines  in real wage rates for skilled 
construction  workers  during  World War II. 
2.5.3  Prices in the United States During World War II  General price con- 
trols were  introduced  in March 1942 in the form of a price freeze.  Over 
time,  this  freeze  gave  way  to  cost-plus  rules  similar to  those  used  in 
Great Britain. Merchants were  allowed  to pass on cost increases  as long 
as  their  markup  was  not  altered.  As  in  Britain, price  controls  slowed 
but did not halt inflation.  Between  1941 and 1945, the CPI rose by about 
22%. Food rationing was introduced  in 1943. Rockoff (1984) reports that 
average  values  of nutrition  under  rationing  exceeded  prewar nutrition 
levels.  In addition,  large black markets existed  for more expensive  food 
items  like  meat.  As  noted  earlier,  many  consumer  durables  were  ra- 
tioned  by  government  edicts  curtailing  or halting  production  of items 
like typewriters  and stoves.  Wages  were  controlled  by the National  La- 
bor  Board,  which  prohibited  wage  growth  rates  in  excess  of  the  CPI 
growth  rate. However,  these  controls were  frequently  circumvented  by 
offering inducements  like vacation,  medical insurance,  and promotions. 
2.5.4  The U.S.  Financial Market in World War II  Bond  yields  were  low 
before the start of the war. In 1938, bond yields  averaged 2.94%. Homer 
and  Sylla (1991) report instances  in 1938 where  nominal  treasury bond 
yields  sold  at negative  yields  because  of the  tax status  of these  issues. 
Between  1938 and 1940, the yield on corporate bonds,  municipal bonds, 
and  treasury bonds  declined  even  further and  then  stabilized  after the 
United  States  entered  the war.  During  the war,  the Treasury and Fed- 
eral Reserve  coordinated  their policies  in order to maintain  a constant 
price schedule  for government  debt issues.  The U.S.  stock market dur- 
ing World War II experienced  a gradual decline  from 1937 to 1942 and 
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2.6 SUMMARIZING  THE EFFECTS  OF THE  WORLD  WARS  ON 
ECONOMIC  ACTIVITY 
The economic  responses  that we have documented  in the previous  sub- 
sections  are the largest economic  events  of the twentieth  century.  Con- 
sider the  correlations  reported  in Tables 4(a) and 4(b) for Great Britain 
and  the  United  States.  The  two  panels  report  correlations  of  various 
aggregate  variables with  output  and military expenditures.  The sample 
period  extends  from  1910 to  1965 for Great Britain and  from  1910 to 
1968 for the United  States.  Results  are reported  for variables expressed 
in terms of deviation  from trend.  Definitions  of the series can be found 
in the  data appendix.  Note  that many  of the patterns  described  earlier 
are reflected  in the  correlations  of Table 4(a). For Britain, military pur- 
chases  (Mil) are positively  correlated  with  output  (GDP),  and  govern- 
ment expenditures  (G-EXP) and negatively  correlated with consumption 
(C), investment  (I), and net-exports  (Netx).  As we noted  earlier, civilian 
employment  (Emp-Civ)  and  wages  (Wage)  are  negatively  correlated 
with  military expenditures,  and output  per worker (GDP/Emp)  is posi- 
tively correlated with  expenditures.  Finally, ex post and real returns on 
interest  rates  (RR-long) are negatively  related  to military outlays.  The 
pattern  of output  correlations  also  reflects  the  dominant  effects  of the 
Table 4a  CORRELATIONS  OF DETRENDED  DATA FOR  GREAT  BRITAIN, 
1910-1965 
Cross-Correlation  with GDP  Cross-Correlation  with  Mil 
(t  +  i)  (t  +  i) 
-1  0  1  -1  0  1 
GDP  0.92  1.00  0.92  0.38  0.59  0.70 
C  0.16  0.27  0.36  -0.49  -0.46  -0.39 
I  -0.11  -0.03  0.07  -0.53  -0.61  -0.60 
Netx  -0.09  -0.15  -0.11  -0.27  -0.47  -0.61 
Gov  0.69  0.71  0.61  0.66  0.90  0.99 
Mil  0.70  0.59  0.39  0.90  1.00  0.90 
G-EXP  0.47  0.33  0.10  0.88  0.92  0.76 
G-REV  -0.16  -0.38  -0.54  0.59  0.37  0.12 
Emp-Civ  0.14  0.18  0.28  -0.27  -0.29  -0.17 
Emp-mil  0.59  0.53  0.36  0.84  0.96  0.94 
GDP/Emp  0.91  0.99  0.91  0.39  0.58  0.68 
Wage  -0.51  -0.57  -0.51  -0.38  -0.56  -0.63 
RR-long  -0.49  -0.58  -0.55  -0.34  -0.56  -0.66 222 *  BRAUN & MCGRATTAN 
Table  4b  CORRELATIONS  OF DETRENDED  DATA FOR  UNITED  STATES, 
1910-1965 
Cross-Correlation  with GNP  Cross-Correlation  with  Mil 
(t  +  i)  (t  +  i) 
-1  0  1  -1  0  1 
GNP  0.88  1.00  0.88  0.65  0.73  0.68 
C  0.62  0.58  0.47  0.05  -0.04  -0.12 
I  0.47  0.44  0.40  0.02  -0.11  -0.15 
Netx  0.03  -0.12  -0.06  0.05  -0.20  -0.25 
Gov  0.51  0.66  0.59  0.67  0.89  0.89 
Mil  0.67  0.73  0.66  0.90  1.00  0.90 
G-EXP  0.40  0.48  0.42  0.82  0.91  0.81 
G-REV  0.72  0.73  0.61  0.89  0.88  0.75 
H  0.84  0.92  0.84  0.50  0.54  0.52 
N  0.83  0.92  0.85  0.52  0.55  0.52 
Emp-mil  0.66  0.75  0.68  0.86  0.98  0.93 
GNP/H  0.77  0.90  0.77  0.69  0.81  0.74 
GNP/N  0.53  0.64  0.49  0.56  0.72  0.67 
Wage  0.31  0.27  0.12  0.04  0.09  0.05 
RR-short  -0.05  -0.12  -0.20  -0.54  -0.50  -0.40 
RR-long  -0.17  -0.24  -0.32  -0.57  -0.53  -0.43 
two  wars.  Consumption  is  only  weakly  procyclical,  and  investment, 
real wages,  and interest  rates are all countercyclical.7 
With a few  exceptions,  the co-movements  in the United  States mimic 
those  for Britain. For example,  the correlations between  military expen- 
ditures  and  the components  of output  have  the same  signs  for the two 
data sets.  On the other hand,  the measure  of the labor input  (N) in the 
United  States  is positively  correlated with  military expenditures  (Mil). 
With respect to correlations with output,  the United States has a positive 
correlation between  investment  (I) and GNP. This result is due,  in part, 
to the fact that our sample  includes  nonwar  periods  when  other shocks 
(e.g.,  technology  shocks)  are important. 
What general lessons  can we draw about the effects of large increases 
in government  purchases?  First, the response  of output  and its compo- 
nents  is  similar  in  both  countries.  The  large  increases  in  government 
expenditures  increased  output  and  crowded  out  consumption  and  in- 
vestment  in  both  countries  during  both  wars.  Second,  both  govern- 
ments  took  an  active  role  in  directing  investment  into  activities  that 
7. Correia,  Neves, and Rebelo  (1992)  have documented  this property  of British  data  previ- 
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were  vital  to  the  war  effort  and  financing  these  expenditures  directly 
when  firms could  not be induced  to do  so.  The evidence  suggests  that 
the  two  governments  were  more  active  in  financing  investment  in 
World War II than  in World War I. In the United  States,  the picture of 
a contracting  capital stock  during  the  Second  World War that emerges 
from the National  Income  and Product Accounts  ignores  the significant 
expansions  in capacity  financed  by  the  U.S.  government.  Third, labor 
productivity  increased  in both  countries  during  the two  world  wars. 
Other labor market patterns  vary across time and the two  countries. 
In Great Britain there  appears  to be a fall in labor input  in both  wars, 
whereas  labor input  increases  in  the  United  States.  This  difference  is 
most  likely  due  to  the  effects  of  conscription.  British armed  forces  at 
their peak accounted  for about 20% of the total labor force in both world 
wars.  The United  States armed forces did not reach this rate until 1944, 
which  is the first year that labor input declines.  In Great Britain, civilian 
employment  plus  the armed  forces constituted  50% of total population 
in 1943. In the United  States,  civilian employment  plus armed forces at 
their peak were  only  44% of the total population. 
Some  of these  facts are consistent  with  the predictions  of neoclassical 
theory.  Hall (1980), Barro (1981), and Aiyagari,  Christiano,  and Eichen- 
baum  (1992) have  found  that the  neoclassical  framework  predicts  tem- 
porary  increases  in  government  purchases  should  increase  output, 
crowd out consumption  and private investment,  and raise employment. 
However,  this  framework  also  predicts  that  labor  productivity  and 
wages  should  fall. Negative  wealth  effects in conjunction  with intertem- 
poral  substitution  effects  lead  households  to  work  harder  today  and 
consume  less  today.  In the labor market, these  effects shift labor supply 
out along  an (essentially)  stable labor demand  schedule. 
Conscription  may resolve  the productivity  puzzle  and the patterns of 
employment  observed  in  Great  Britain.  In  isolation,  conscription  re- 
duces  households'  time  endowment.  This  in  turn  shifts  labor supply 
left  in  the  civilian  sector,  which  results  in  a rise in labor productivity 
and lower  civilian employment. 
Government  investment  may also  explain  the measured  increases  in 
productivity  in the two  countries.  Increases  in government  investment 
can  shift  out  the  labor  demand  schedule  and  thereby  increase  labor 
productivity.  With the labor demand  schedule  shifting out, the contem- 
poraneous  increase  in  labor input  and  labor productivity  observed  in 
the  United  States  is no  longer  a puzzle.  Moreover,  when  government 
investment  is modeled  in conjunction  with  conscription,  the British ex- 
perience  of increased  output  and  productivity  in a period  where  labor 
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In the  next  section  we  will  examine  the  effects  of  conscription  and 
government  investment  in a neoclassical  framework.  The central focus 
of this analysis  will be to investigate  the role of conscription  and govern- 
ment  investment  in explaining  the basic facts we  have  documented  for 
Great Britain and  the United  States. 
3. The  Model 
To  isolate  the  effects  of  government  consumption,  conscription,  and 
government  investment  during  wartime,  we  focus  on  a  very  simple 
abstraction.8 Let ht be  the  number  of hours  spent  producing  goods  in 
period  t, and  let at be  the  number  of hours  in the  army in period  t. If 
there is one  unit of time to allocate,  then  leisure  in period  t is given  by 
It =  1 -  ht - at.  (1) 
We assume  that the preferences  of a typical household  depend  on their 
consumption  of goods  and leisure,  e.g., 
E  Pttu(ct, lt)lo  ,  (2) 
_t=O 
where  ct is consumption  in period  t, P is a discount  factor, x0 is the state 
of the world  in date 0 which  is taken as given  by households,  and E is 
an expectation  operator conditioned  on the initial state. 
There is a technology  available to the households  that requires inputs 
of labor and  capital.  Households  can invest  and,  thus,  accumulate  pri- 
vate capital. They also receive public capital for private production.  The 
resource  constraint  for the economy  is 
Ct +  it +  i,t  +  bg,t =  Yt =  f(kt, kg,  t, ht),  (3) 
where  it is private investment  in period  t, ig, is government  investment 
in t, bg  t is government  consumption  in t, kt is the private capital stock 
in  t,  kg, is  the  stock  of  government  capital  in  t,  Yt is  output  for the 
private sector in t, and f is the production  function that exhibits constant 
returns to scale with respect to all three inputs.  Note  that the production 
8. We include  hours  in the army and abstract from distortionary  finance,  public services, 
and shocks to technology. Related  papers  are by Aiyagari,  Christiano,  and Eichenbaum 
(1992),  Barro  (1981),  Baxter  and King (1990),  Hall (1980),  and Ohanian  (1993). Macroeconomics  of War and Peace ? 225 
function  does  not depend  on an exogenous  technology  shock.  Both the 
private and  the public capital stock are assumed  to depreciate  at a rate 
of 8 per period,  e.g., 
kt  +  =  (1  -  8)kt  +  it 
(4) 
kg,t+i  =  (1  -  8)kg,t +  ig,t. 
In period  t, all agents  know  the history  of the state.  Thus,  current con- 
sumption,  labor,  and  investment  decisions  will  depend  on the history 
{(ks,  kg,s,  as, ig,  s  bg,s),  s  =  0, ..  .  t}. Assume  that military hours,  govern- 
ment  investment,  and government  expenditures  are Markov processes 
(of order q) that are known  to the  agents.  Then  consumption,  invest- 
ment,  and  labor decisions  are functions  of current values  of the  state, 
for  example,  (kt, kg t, z,  .  .  .  Zt-q)  in  period  t where  zt  =  (ig,  t, bg,  t, at). 
Let  xt =  [kt, kg,  t  z,  ..  .  Zt_q]  be  the  vector  of  state  variables  at date  t. 
An equilibrium for this economy  is a set of decision  functions  c(xt), i(xt), 
and  h(xt),  and  a law  of  motion  for the  state,  xt+1 =  Y(xt), such  that 
households  maximize  Equation (2) subject to Equations (1), (3), (4), and 
processes  for government  consumption,  investment,  and  military em- 
ployment. 
This  model  can be  used  to  quantify  the  effects  of  government  con- 
sumption,  investment,  and  conscription  on  the  economy  during  war- 
time.  This  involves  choosing  a  parameterization  of  preferences  and 
technology,  solving  for the  equilibrium  decision  functions,  and  using 
the  decision  functions  and  some  process  for the  exogenous  shocks  to 
simulate  time  series. 
The  functional  forms  that  we  use  for utility  and  production  are as 
follows: 
u(Ct, lt) = 
- I  -  - 
f(kt, kg,t, ht) =  (bkP +  (1  -  b)kG,)  O/Phl-0 
where 
B =  0.96,  y  =  3, w  =  1, X =  3/2,  b =  1/2,  p =  1, and O =  1/4.  (5) 
For the  discount  factor,  we  choose  p  =  0.96,  which  corresponds  to a 
4% annual  interest  rate  if  consumption  is  not  growing  over  time.  A 
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in  utility.  With w  =  1, the  utility  function  has  a logarithmic  form.  To 
calculate the annual depreciation  rate, we projected it -  (kt+1 -  kt) onto 
kt using  U.S.  data.  The  resulting  estimate  of  8 is  6.54%.  This  rate of 
depreciation  is also used  for Britain. A value  of  1/4 for 0 implies  that the 
capital  share  of  income  is  25%. The  values  of  p  =  1 and  b  =  1/2 for 
technology  imply that private and government  capital are perfect substi- 
tutes  in production.  The constant  X determines  the scale of the compo- 
nents  of output.  A value of 3/2  was chosen  so that the steady  state values 
of these  variables  lie between  0 and  1. For the  most  part, our choices 
of the utility and technology  parameters and the parameters of the Mar- 
kov chain imply  that the first moments  of ctlyt, itlyt, kt/yt, and ht in the 
model  are approximately  equal  to  the  sample  means  of  the  U.S.  data 
during  the postwar  period.  The differences  between  the first moments 
of the U.S.  and British data are due  primarily to differences  in govern- 
ment  expenditures  and conscription.  Therefore,  we  use  the parameters 
of  Equation  (5) for both  countries.  In our  final  remarks,  we  describe 
how  the above  choices  affect our results. 
To compute  the  equilibrium  decision  functions,  we  assume  that the 
vector of exogenous  variables is a Markov chain.  Let zJ be the value for 
Zt =  (ig,  t  bg,  t  at) if the jth  state occurs in period  t. Assume  further that 
zt takes  on  n possible  values  and  denote  the transition  matrix by  Tr.  In 
this  case,  the  decision  rules  for consumption,  investment,  and  hours 
are indexed  by the state and defined  on  R2, e.g.,  ci(kt, kg  t), j  =  1, . . ., 
n. The  algorithm  used  to compute  the  decision  functions  is  described 
in Appendix  A. 
To simulate  the model,  we also need  to specify  the conditional  means 
and  transition  probabilities  for  government  investment,  government 
consumption,  and  military hours.  Unfortunately,  in the case of the ex- 
ogenous  state  variables,  we  have  very  few  observations  and  a large 
number  of parameters  to identify.  Our strategy is to choose  a specifica- 
tion that reproduces  the magnitude  and timing of bg,  t  i, t, and at during 
World War II for the  United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom.  For the 
United  States during World War II, we assume  that the vector of exoge- 
nous variables (z) takes on seven  possible  values  (i.e.,  n =  7). The seven 
vectors  are chosen  by matching  realizations  of ig,  tlYt bg,  tyt, and atlht in 
the  model  with  observations  in  the  United  States  between  1939 and 
1945. In Figure 3(a),  we  plot  these  ratios for the  United  States  during 
World War II. To make the ratios in the data and the model comparable, 
we  subtract compensation  of government  employees,  net exports,  and 
inventories  from GNP when  constructing  Yt. To construct  bg  t, we  take 
total government  purchases  and  subtract the  compensation  of govern- 
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is constructed  from GOPO  capital stock  using  Equation  (4).9 The year 
1939 is  assumed  to  be  peacetime.  Between  1938 and  1939,  there  was 
little,  if any,  preparation  for war  in  the  United  States.  Once  the  war 
began  in  Europe,  the  United  States began  investing  in privately  oper- 
ated  projects  and  increasing  the  number  of  troops.  At that  point,  the 
involvement  of the United  States was  still uncertain.  By 1941, the level 
of  investment  of  the  government  in  projects  operated  by  the  private 
sector was  one  third of its peak level.  On the  other hand,  in 1941, the 
share of government  consumption  in output,  (bgly), was at its 1939 level. 
At  the  end  of  1941,  the  United  States  declared  war,  and  non-GOPO 
government  expenditures  and  conscription  rose  significantly.  By 1943, 
the fraction of output  used  for GOPO investment  had hit its peak, while 
other expenditures  continued  to rise. The pattern of military hours rela- 
tive to private hours is similar to that of government  consumption.  Both 
lag government  investment,  and both are high  at the end of the war. It 
is this pattern that we  model when  specifying  the exogenous  processes. 
Our  assumption  about  the  timing  of  government  expenditures  and 
conscription  is  important.  From the  perspective  of  the  private  sector, 
government  investment  is  a signal  of  future  increases  in  conscription 
and future increases  in government  expenditures.  In effect, it is a signal 
of future  taxes.  The  private  sector,  seeing  government  investment  in- 
creasing today,  updates  its forecast for the likelihood  of war and,  there- 
fore,  for the  likelihood  of  a large  fiscal  shock.  Their response  to  this 
government  investment  and expected  future spending  is an increase in 
hours  of work  and,  in some  cases,  an increase  in private investment.10 
The increase in hours of work leads to an immediate  fall in labor produc- 
tivity  because  capital  cannot  adjust  immediately.  However,  if a suffi- 
ciently large increase in government  expenditures  is projected,  the total 
capital stock increases.  The increase  in capital can lead to a rise in pro- 
ductivity  in  the  period  following  the  increase  in  government  invest- 
ment.  The  increase  in  capital  can,  therefore,  produce  a  positive 
correlation  between  government  consumption  and  labor productivity. 
Conscription  can also  increase  labor productivity.  An  increase  in con- 
scription leads  to a decrease  in private hours  of work and,  therefore,  to 
an increase  in labor productivity. 
To  parameterize  the  Markov  chain  for  the  British  experiment,  we 
again assume  that the vector  of exogenous  variables (z) takes on seven 
9. Emp-mil  and  H,  which  are  defined  in  the  data  appendix,  are used  to  construct  the 
ratio of military hours  to private hours  of work. 
10. We will later show  that increases  in private investment  can occur even  if private and 
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possible  values.  The war in Europe started two years earlier than in the 
United  States,  but the changes  in government  investment,  government 
consumption,  and  military hours  during  1944 and  1945 were  relatively 
small  in  Britain.  Thus,  to  economize  on  parameters,  we  assume  that 
these  two  periods  represent  the  same  state  for the  Markov  chain.  In 
Figure 3(b), we  plot  the  ratios ig,  tlYt bg,  tYt, and atlht for Britain for the 
years 1938-1945.  To construct Yt,  we  subtract the compensation  of mili- 
tary employees,  net  exports,  and  inventories  from GDP.  To construct 
bg,  t, we  take total government  expenditures  and subtract the compensa- 
tion  of military employees  and  Ashworth's  (1953) measure  of govern- 
ment  investment  (igt).  The  year  1938 is  assumed  to be  peacetime.  In 
1939, they  started investing  in some  projects but not to the extent  that 
the  United  States  had  been  investing  before  it entered  the  war.  How- 
ever,  as in the  United  States,  there  was  little change  in other  govern- 
ment expenditures  before the war. The largest increases  in government 
consumption  and  conscription  occurred after the  British declared  war. 
The pattern  of  shocks  that we  see  for Britain is very  similar to that of 
the  United  States.  At  the  midpoint  of  the  war,  the  fraction of output 
used  for government  investment  hit its peak while  other expenditures 
and conscription  continued  to rise. Government  consumption  and mili- 
tary hours  lag government  investment  but  are high  at the  end  of  the 
war when  government  investment  is low. 
In Table 5, we  report the conditional  means  and transition probabili- 
ties for government  investment  (ig), government  consumption  (bg), and 
the  fraction of  time  in the  military (a) for our two  experiments.  These 
values  of the  three  exogenous  shocks  imply  that the  ratios of govern- 
ment  expenditures  to  output,  ig,  tYt and  bg,  tYt,  and  military  hours  to 
private  hours,  at/ht, for the  model  are equal  to those  in the  data if we 
observe  a war with  the same pattern and duration as World War II. We 
choose  the transition probabilities so that the ergodic probability of state 
1 (peace)  is  0.82.  Thus,  if the  duration  of  war,  including  periods  for 
preparation,  is  on  average  six  years,  there  would  be  three  wars  per 
century.  The probability for being  in each of the other states is approxi- 
mately equal to 0.03. The only difference between  the United  States and 
the  United  Kingdom  is  the  specification  of  Ir71 and  7r77. We increased 
the likelihood  of being  in state 7 because  we  assume  that both 1944 and 
1945 constitute  state 7 for the United  Kingdom. 
In Figure 4, we  plot ratios of consumption,  investment,  and spending 
to output  for the United  States and the model.  The U.S.  ratios for 1937 
through  1968 are in the top panel  (Figure 4a). In Figure 4(b), we  display 
a simulated  war of the  magnitude  and  duration  of World War II. This 
simulation  is based  on the  parameters  of Equation (5) and Table 5. Al- Macroeconomics  of War and Peace ? 229 
Figure 3 GOVERNMENT  INVESTMENT,  GOVERNMENT  CONSUMPTION, 
AND CONSCRIPTION  DURING  WORLD  WAR  II. 
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Table 5  CONDITIONAL  MEANS AND  TRANSITION PROBABILITIES  FOR 
GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT, GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION, 
AND  MILITARY HOURS 
United States  United Kingdom 
ig  bg  a  ig  bg  a  iT5 
1  0  .0762  .0024  .0010  .0534  .0057  r1  =  .97,  r12 =  .03 
2  .0024  .0751  .0033  .0024  .0858  .0069  rr21 =  .05,  rr22 =  .20,  I23  =  .75 
3  .0153  .0892  .0121  .0036  .1705  .0348  'r33  =  .25,  F34 =  .75 
4  .0401  .1497  .0241  .0145  .1853  .0502  rr4 =  .25,  7r45 =  .75 
5  .0406  .1678  .0510  .0131  .1830  .0570  -755 =  .25,  6- =  .75 
6  .0235  .1750  .0626  .0105  .1850  .0625  r66 =  .25,  'T67  =  .75 
7  .0177  .1384  .0674  .0056  .1635  .0660  f71  =  .9,  77=  -1 
(.75)  (.25) 
"All of the transition  probabilities  for the United  States and Great Britain are the same except for state 
7 where  the British probabilities  are in parentheses. 
though  we  report only  one realization,  any war with the same duration 
and sequence  of states would  exhibit the same pattern shown  in Figure 
4(b).  As  in the  U.S.  series,  we  find  that increases  in government  con- 
sumption  and  investment  crowd  out  private  consumption  and  invest- 
ment  and  increase  output.  However,  relative  to the  United  States,  the 
model's  prediction  of the decline  in the ratio of consumption  to output 
is too small. The result is due to the fact that the predicted rise in output 
is too  small.  The U.S.  output  was  17% above  trend at its peak in 1943 
and  1944. The peak of output  in the simulations  occurs in state 4. State 
4 corresponds  to 1942 when  output  in the United  States was  12% above 
trend.  In  the  simulations,  output  is  only  9% above  trend  in  state  4. 
What  drives  the  increase  in  output  in  the  model?  In our model,  both 
hours  and  the  total capital stock are increasing.  In Figure 4(b), we  ob- 
serve a rise in private investment  in 1940 (or state 2). This increase leads 
to  an  increase  in  the  capital  stock  in  the  following  year.  In  1941 and 
1942, total investment  is still high  because  of increases  in government 
investment.  Significant  declines  in the  total capital stock do  not  occur 
until  1944 or  1945 (i.e.,  states  6 and  7).  Hours  growth,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  rapid  from  1939 to  1940 but  then  stops  as conscription  picks 
up.  This  suggests  that  the  problem  is  not  the  response  in capital but 
the  response  in hours.  Theory  predicts  that hours  rise in response  to 
expectations  of large fiscal  shocks.  However,  because  we  assume  that 
hours  must  be used  for the military, expected  increases  in military ser- 
vice  at the  end  of the  war lead  the  private  sector to increase  hours  of 
production  in the initial periods  when  conscription  is low. Macroeconomics  of War and Peace ? 231 
Figure 4 SIMULATED AND  ACTUAL CHANGES  IN THE COMPOSITION 
OF OUTPUT. 
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The simulations  for Britain show  a pattern in the shares of consump- 
tion  and investment  that is similar to that of Figure 4(b). In particular, 
the low point in the consumption  to output ratio occurs too early. How- 
ever,  for the  British experiment,  we  come  close  to matching  the maxi- 
mum  response  of  output  to  the  wartime  shocks.  The  model  predicts 
that in  state 3 (1940) output  is  16% above  its peacetime  level.  In 1940, 
output  in  the  data  was  15% above  trend.  In 1941, output  in  the  data 
reached  its  peak  at 17% above  trend.  Because  of the  large increase  in 
output,  we  see  a large decline  in the  consumption  to output  ratio.  In 
the data,  this ratio falls 39%, and in the model  it falls 33%. 
The simulation  displayed  in Figure 4(c) assumes  that the capital stocks 
are not perfectly  substitutable  (p =  0.5). For values  of p less  than 1, we 
find a larger increase  in output  during war. This is not surprising  given 
the fact that an increase in ig leads to high returns in subsequent  periods 
and,  therefore,  larger  responses  in  hours  of  work.  What  we  do  find 
surprising  is  that the  consumption  and  investment  ratios are in much 
better  agreement  with  the  data than  in the  case  of perfect  substitutes. 
In Figure 4(c), we  plot these  ratios for the parameterization  of Equation 
(5) and Table 5 with  p =  0.5 instead  of p =  1. In addition,  we  set 0  = 
1/3 and reset the parameters of Table 5 so as to maintain the same steady- 
state  ratios  for  Ct/yt  and  it/yt and  the  same  realizations  of  ig,  tYt and 
bg,  t/yt. The ratio of consumption  to output  does  not hit its low  point too 
early  and  falls  to  about  the  same  level  as  that  observed  in  the  data. 
More  important,  we  do  not  see  a negative  ratio of private  investment 
to  output.  However,  a choice  of  p <  1,  or imperfect  substitutability, 
may have  problems  if our model  is to be used  for predicting  the effects 
of fiscal shocks  during  peacetime.  During  peacetime,  the stock of gov- 
ernment  capital,  kg, is  small.  If  p  <  1,  the  marginal  product  can  be 
very  high  but  depends  on  the  value  of  b. Unless  we  assume  that the 
government  ignores  the  fact that it could  achieve  a high  return  from 
subsidizing  investment,  this choice  of technology  does  not make much 
sense.  But the  results  do  suggest  that  some  technological  distinction 
between  public and  private capital may be warranted. 
In Table 6, we  report the time paths of hours and productivity  for the 
U.S.  and  U.K.  experiments.  Both  experiments  use  the  parameters  of 
Equation (5) and Table 5. First consider  the results for the United  States. 
As  we  noted  earlier, hours  rise in the  first few  periods  of the war but 
fall once conscription  increases  significantly.  If we compare this column 
to  "Man-hours  per  capita"  in  Table 2,  we  see  a  similar rise  between 
1939 and  1941 in  the  model  and  the  data.  However,  after 1942, hours 
rise in  the  data  and  fall in  the  model.  For productivity,  we  find  good 
agreement  between  the model  and data during the war. Notice  that the Macroeconomics  of War  and  Peace  ?  233 
Table 6  HOURS  AND PRODUCTIVITY  FOR  MODEL  SIMULATIONS  OF 
WORLD WAR IP 
United  States  United  Kingdom 
Labor  Labor 
Hours  productivity  Hours  productivity 
Year  (1941  =  100)  (1941  =  100)  (1938  =  100)  (1938  =  100) 
1938  91  95  100  100 
1939  91  97  121  97 
1940  99  97  119  101 
1941  100  100  114  104 
1942  100  103  110  106 
1943  94  106  105  108 
1944  90  108  99  111 
1945  85  110  102  110 
"Note  that  we have added 2%  annual  growth to labor  productivity  to facilitate  comparison  with Tables 
1 and 2. 
simulation  captures  the  8% increase  in productivity  found  in the  data 
between  1941 and 1944. (See Table 2.) Furthermore, the model's  predic- 
tions for labor productivity  also compare favorably with the data on real 
wages.  Both decline  early and then  rise strongly  at the end  of the war. 
Note,  however,  that an increase in labor productivity  implies  a decrease 
in capital productivity  when  technology  shocks  are absent.  A declining 
marginal product  of capital can explain  the fall in stock market returns 
observed  during  the  later part of World War II but cannot  account  for 
the decrease  in the capital-output  ratio. 
Our  U.K.  simulation  produces  a  much  larger  increase  in  hours  of 
work  than  the  U.S.  simulation.  This  explains  why  we  see  a larger in- 
crease  in  output  in the  U.K.  experiment  than  in the  U.S.  experiment. 
In other respects,  the pattern of hours  is similar in the two countries: a 
sharp  rise  followed  by  a steady  decline.  There  is  a  slight  increase  in 
hours of work for the United  Kingdom  at the end of the simulation,  but 
this increase  is due  to the fact that 1944 and 1945 are assumed  to be the 
same state when  we  are calculating the Markov chain. If an eighth  state 
is  added  for  1945,  then  the  predicted  increase  disappears.  Note  that 
much of the decline in hours for the two countries is due to conscription. 
Average  weekly  hours  for the United  Kingdom  are reported  in Table 1 
for 1938 and  1943 through  1945. As in the simulation,  we  see  a decline 
in hours  at the end  of the war with  hours  of work in 1938 at about the 
same level as in 1945. The pattern of productivity  in the U.K. simulation 234  .  BRAUN & MCGRATTAN 
is  similar  to  that  of  the  United  States.  Productivity  falls initially  with 
capital  fixed  and  hours  of work  rising.  As  the  capital stock  increases, 
labor productivity  rises. Thus, we find productivity  positively  correlated 
with  government  expenditures  in both  countries. 
To see  if these  results  are robust to changes  in the parameterization 
of  Equation  (5) and  Table 5,  we  tried  some  alternative  specifications. 
Consider  first the  parameters  of  preferences.  For the  weight  on  con- 
sumption  in utility,  we  use  1/4. If we  increase  y to 1/3, the value  used  by 
Kydland  and  Prescott  (1982),  we  find  a  larger  steady-state  value  for 
hours  of  work  but  a  similar  pattern  in  the  response  of  hours  to  the 
shocks  during  the war. With a larger value  of hours in the steady  state, 
it is necessary  to increase  the values  of a in the Markov chain. Then the 
increase in military hours produces  a larger decline in hours toward the 
end  of  the  war.  The  value  of  o chosen  for  our  experiments  is  1.  To 
significantly  change  our results,  we  must assume  either that agents  are 
very risk averse  (o  large) or risk neutral (o  close  to 0). For most  values 
used in the business  cycle literature, we do not find much of a difference 
from  what  we  reported  earlier.  The  discount  factor,  which  we  set  at 
0.96,  affects the consumption  versus  saving  decision.  When  we change 
this  parameter,  we  find  differences  in the  steady-state  values  but little 
difference  in the responses  to shocks. 
Consider  next the parameters of technology.  As we noted  earlier, the 
choice  of  p significantly  affects  our results.  We use  p  =  1 because  we 
want a theory of the effects of government  purchases  that can be applied 
in  both  peacetime  and  wartime.  However,  improvements  in  the  re- 
sponses  of consumption  and investment  suggest  that alternative speci- 
fications  of  technology  should  be  explored.  For the  share  of capital in 
income,  we  use  1/4. If we  increase  the  value  of this  parameter,  we  in- 
crease  the  level  of investment  in periods  of peace,  but we  do  not find 
a significant  reduction  in  the  response  of investment  to fiscal shocks. 
Finally, consider  changes  in the transition probabilities.  To significantly 
affect our results,  we would  need  to choose  values  for ir that imply very 
different  ergodic  distributions.  Our current specification  assumes  that 
most  of the time is spent  in peacetime.  If we  increase the time spent  in 
any  of  the  prewar  or war  periods,  we  change  the  decision  functions, 
but we also simulate  wars that last too long from a historical standpoint. 
In summary,  we  have presented  a simple model  that we use to quan- 
tify the effects  of changes  in government  investment,  government  con- 
sumption,  and military hours.  We have shown  that, although  the model 
abstracts from shocks  to technology  and  to taxes,  the model  does  cap- 
ture a significant  fraction of the movement  of GNP and its components, 
hours  of  work,  and  productivity.  We  have  also  shown  that  it is  not Macroeconomics  of War  and  Peace  ?  235 
necessary  to include  imperfectly  competitive  markets  to get  a positive 
correlation between  productivity  and  government  expenditures.  But it 
is  important  to  distinguish  the  uses  of  government  expenditures  and 
the  timing  of different  expenditures  during  the  war.  Finally,  we  have 
shown  that our theory  can more  easily  account  for observations  of the 
labor market in Britain than in the United  States. With all agents  forced 
to put  time  into  the  military,  we  find  a significant  decline  in hours  in 
periods  when  the  rate  of  conscription  is  high.  In  the  United  States, 
during World War II, we saw large increases in both private and military 
hours.  In Appendix  B, we explore an extension  of this model that distin- 
guishes  civilian  and  noncivilian  employment  as  well  as  variations  in 
hours  of work  and employment. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have documented  the responses  of the British and U.S. 
economies  to  the  two  World Wars and  proposed  a simple  model  that 
allows  us to quantify the roles of government  investment,  conscription, 
and  government  consumption.  Our model  captures  a significant  frac- 
tion  of  the  movement  in  GNP  and  its  components  and  is  consistent 
with  the  U.S.  observations  of  rising  hours  and  average  productivity. 
We  find  further  that  the  British  experience  of  declining  employment 
and  increasing  productivity  can  be  explained  by  Britain's  high  con- 
scription  rates. 
There  are  a number  of  features  of  the  data  that  the  model  cannot 
explain.  Both  countries  exhibited  large  increases  in  hours  per worker 
during World War II, yet the pattern of employment  differed in the two 
countries.  Our model  makes no distinction  between  these  two margins. 
In  addition,  our  model  predicts  that  an  increase  in  government  pur- 
chases  has opposite  effects on the output-capital  ratio and labor produc- 
tivity.  Thus,  it is difficult  for our model  to reconcile  the large decrease 
in the  capital-output  ratio and  concurrent  decline  in interest  rates that 
occurred in the United  States during  World War II. 
Our  analysis  raises  other  questions  as  well.  For instance,  does  the 
large buildup  of GOPO capital that occurred during the war have impli- 
cations for peacetime?  Between  1939 and 1945, the private output-capital 
ratio increased  by  33% (see,  e.g.,  Blanchard and  Fischer,  1989). Since 
the war, this ratio has remained  relatively stable. The increase in GOPO 
capital during  the  war certainly  offers  a partial explanation  for the  in- 
crease  in  the  ratio of  output  to  private  capital.  But why  has  the  ratio 
not fallen back to its prewar level  in the postwar  period as the stock of 
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GOPO  investment  in  the  postwar  period,  but  the  magnitude  of  this 
investment  has been  small.  In Figure 2 we  can see that by 1955, GOPO 
capital constituted  less than 10% of the total capital stock in manufactur- 
ing.  To explain  the  high  output-capital  ratio in the  postwar  period  re- 
quires  us  to look  beyond  GOPO  capital.  Aschauer  (1993) and  Gordon 
(1969) have  argued  that other forms of government  investment  like in- 
frastructure are important for understanding  growth  in the postwar  pe- 
riod. The postwar  transition from privately operated railways to a public 
highway  system  and air transit system  with government-owned  airports 
may  be  one  plausible  explanation  for  the  fact that  the  output-capital 
ratio has remained  high  in the postwar  period. 
Changes  in  the  participation  rates may  offer an alternative  explana- 
tion  for the  high  output-capital  ratio.  During  the  Second  World War, 
participation  rates  of  women  increased  rapidly.  After  the  war  many 
women  remained  in the work  force.  Participation rates of women  rose 
by  60% between  1930 and  1950,  with  most  of  this  increase  occurring 
during  and  after  World  War II. Higher  participation  rates  may  have 
resulted  in a more intensive  use  of capital in the postwar  period. 
Data  Appendix 
1. BRITISH  DATA SOURCES 
*  GDP: Gross Domestic  Product in constant  1980 prices, per capita. The 
source  for  this  time  series  is  Mitchell  (1988),  pp.  831-841;  GDP  at 
market  prices,  current  prices  and  GDP  at  market  prices  constant 
prices  various  base  years.  The  population  measure  is  described  be- 
low.  Note  that  between  1910 and  1920,  GDP  and  its  components 
include  Ireland; after 1920 they  exclude  the Republic of Ireland. 
*  C: Consumers'  Expenditure  in constant  1980 prices,  per capita from 
Mitchell  (1988), pp.  831-841. 
*  I: Gross  Domestic  Fixed  Capital Formation  in  constant  1980 prices, 
per capita from Mitchell  (1988), pp.  831-841. 
*  Netx:  Exports  less  Imports  in  constant  1980 prices,  per capita from 
Mitchell  (1988), pp.  831-841. 
*  Gov: Public Authorities'  current expenditures  on goods  and services 
in constant  1980 prices,  per capita from Mitchell (1988), pp.  831-841. 
*  Mil: Gross  Public Expenditure  of the  United  Kingdom  on  army and 
navy  and air force plus  votes  of credit during  the war years  deflated 
by the  GDP-deflator,  per capita from Mitchell (1988), pp.  587-594. 
*  G-EXP: Gross Public Expenditure  of the United  Kingdom  deflated  by 
the GDP-deflator,  per capita from Mitchell  (1988), pp.  587-594. Macroeconomics  of War  and  Peace  *  237 
*  G-REV: Total Gross  Public Income  of  the  United  Kingdom  deflated 
by the GDP-deflator,  per capita from Mitchell (1988), pp.  587-594. 
*  Emp-Civ: Total civilian employment,  per capita from Feinstein  (1972), 
pp.  T126-T127. 
*  Emp-Mil:  Armed  Forces,  per  capita  from  Feinstein  (1972), 
pp.  T126-T127. 
*  GDP/Emp:  Output  per  worker  from  Feinstein  (1972), pp.  T52-T53. 
The  numerator  is  Feinstein's  GDP-compromise  constant  factor cost 
estimate,  and  the  denominator  is  total  civilian  employment  plus 
armed forces. 
*  Wage: Index  of weekly  wage  rates,  divided  by the Labour Gazette's 
retail price index  from Feinstein  (1972), p. T140-T141. 
*  RR-long: Yield on 2.5% Consols  Mitchell (1988), p. 678, deflated using 
the GDP-deflator  from Mitchell (1988). 
*  Population:  Estimated  Mid-Year Home  Population  for England  and 
Wales  plus  Scotland  plus  Ireland  through  1920.  For 1921 through 
1965,  population  is  for England  and  Wales,  Scotland  and  Northern 
Ireland.  The source  is Mitchell  (1988), pp.  13-14. 
2. U.S. DATA SOURCES" 
*  GNP:  Gross  National  Product  in  1982 constant  dollars  per  capita. 
From  1910 to  1928,  the  source  is  Romer  (1989). For 1929-1969,  the 
source  is National Income  and Product Accounts 1929-1982. 
*  C: Consumer  expenditures  in 1982 constant  dollars per capita. From 
1910 to 1928, the source is Romer (1987), Table 3. From 1929 to 1969, 
the source  is the NIPA. 
*  I: Fixed Investment  in 1982 constant  dollars per capita. From 1910 to 
1928,  the  source  is  Romer  (1987),  Table  3.  From  1929 to  1969,  the 
source  is the NIPA. 
*  Netx:  Net  Exports in  1982 constant  dollars  per capita.  From 1910 to 
1928 the  fraction  of  net  exports  in  1929 constant  dollar GNP  as  re- 
ported in Kendrick (1961), pp. 293-297,  was applied  to Romer's GNP 
time series  to produce  estimates  of constant  dollar net exports. 
*  Gov: Government  purchases  of goods  and  services  in constant  1982 
dollars,  per  capita.  From  1910 to  1928,  the  source  is  Romer  (1987), 
Table 3. From 1929 to 1969, the source  is the NIPA. 
*  GOPO capital and private capital reported in Figure 2 are gross stocks 
of  equipment  and  structures  in  manufacturing  and  government- 
owned  gross  stocks  of  equipment  and  structures  in  manufacturing 
11. The data used in this paper were made available  in part  by the Inter-University  Con- 
sortium for Political and Social Research. The data were originally  collected by the 
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from  Wasson,  Musgrave,  and  Harkins  in  Survey of Current Business 
(1970) expressed  in 1958 constant  dollars. For some  of the model  sim- 
ulations,  we  needed  1982 constant  dollar estimates  of GOPO.  These 
were  calculated  by expressing  total net GOPO capital (all industries) 
as  a fraction  of  1958 dollar  net  total  private  capital  (all industries). 
Then  this  fraction  was  applied  to  1982 constant  dollar estimates  of 
net  total  private  capital  (all industries)  in  Fixed Reproducible  Tangible 
Wealth in the U.S.,  1925-1985  (Dept.  of Commerce)  to produce  1982 
constant  dollar estimates. 
*  Mil: Military outlays  of the  federal  government  on  the  army,  navy, 
and air force, in constant  1982 dollars,  per capita. Current dollar fig- 
ures  are from Historical Statistics of the U.S.,  series  Y-458:60.  These 
were  converted  to  constant  dollar values  by  deflating  by  the  GNP- 
deflator. 
*  G-EXP: U.S.  Federal Government  expenditures  from Historical Statis- 
tics of the U.S.  (1975), series  Y336 and  Y457, converted  into  constant 
dollars by deflating  using  the GNP-deflator,  per capita. 
*  G-REV: U.S.  Federal  Government  Revenues  from  Historical Statis- 
tics of the U.S.  (1975), series  Y336 and Y457, converted  into  constant 
dollars  by  deflating  using  the  GNP-deflator,  per  capita  series 
Y335,Y339,Y343. 
*  H: Total Man-hours  from Kendrick as reported in Long Term  Economic 
Growth (1973),  Dept.  of  Commerce,  p.  1141,  divided  by  population 
over  16.  This  series  is  reported  as  an  index  with  a  1958 base.  The 
index  was  scaled by hours  worked  in 1958 in private industries  from 
NIPA  1929-1982  (1986),  p.  287,  to  convert  its  units  into  billions  of 
hours. 
*  N:  Labor input  from  Kendrick  as  reported  in  Long Term Economic 
Growth (1973),  Dept.  of  Commerce,  p.  1141,  divided  by  population 
over  16.  This  series  is  reported  as  an  index  with  a  1958 base.  The 
index  was  scaled by hours  worked  in 1958 in private industries  from 
NIPA  1929-1982  (1986),  p.  287,  to  convert  its  units  into  billions  of 
hours. 
*  Emp-mil: Military personnel  on active duty from Historical Statistics of 
the U.S.  (1975), series Y904, converted  into an hours measure  assum- 
ing annual  hours  worked  are 2,500,  per capita. 
*  GNP/H:  Labor Productivity  measured  using  man-hours. 
*  GNP/N:  Labor Productivity  measured  using  labor input. 
*  Wage: Real wages  in manufacturing.  From 1910 to 1919 they are mea- 
sured  using  payroll  average  hourly  earnings  in manufacturing  from 
Historical Statistics of the U.S.,  p.  168.  The  1920 observation  is  the 
average  of this time  series  and average  hourly  earnings  in all manu- Macroeconomics  of War  and  Peace  *  239 
facturing  industries,  p.  170.  From 1921 to  1969,  the  p.  170 average 
hourly earnings  numbers  are used.  Real wages  are then calculated by 
deflating  by  the  CPI all-items  as reported  in Historical Statistics of the 
U.S.,  p.  211. 
*  RR-short: Yield on commercial paper from NBER tape, deflated using 
the GDP-deflator. 
*  RR-long: Moody's  AAA  bond  yields  from NBER tape  series  number 
a13108, deflated  using  the  GDP-deflator. 
*  Population:  U.S.  population  over  16 from  Historical Statistics of the 
U.S.  (1975), p.  10. The observations  1917-1919  have been augmented 
with  armed forces (p. 1141 in Colonial Statistics) using  (0.53  x  Emp- 
mil)  +  pop  to  account  for  the  fact  that  the  pop  dataset  does  not 
include  forces  overseas  during  World War I. The fraction 0.53 is re- 
ported in Colonial Statistics,  p. 1140, as the average fraction of armed 
forces overseas  during  World War I. 
Appendix  A 
In Section  3,  we  defined  an  equilibrium  to be  decision  functions  that 
maximize  households'  utility  subject to certain resource  constraints.  In 
this Appendix,  we  describe  the algorithm used  to compute  the equilib- 
rium decision  functions.12 The general  formulation  of our problem is as 
follows:  find G : n  C  R"  --  Rm  that satisfies 
F(G; x)  =  0, 
where  F : T1 --  >  2,  /j, j  =  1,  2 are function  spaces,  and  x is  an  n- 
dimensional  vector and is some  point  in Q2.  In our case,  the function  G 
is the vector  of consumption  functions  that are indexed  by the state of 
the Markov chain governing  exogenous  states.  The first element  of the 
vector x is private capital, and the second  is public capital. The mapping 
F is  the  first-order  necessary  condition  that  relates  current  marginal 
utility  to  the  expectation  of  the  marginal  utility  next  period  weighted 
by  the  return  from  holding  capital.  Given  the  consumption  function, 
the remaining  first-order conditions  can be used  to determine  the hours 
and investment  decision  functions. 
Thus,  we  are looking  for m functions  that  (approximately)  satisfy  a 
set of functional  equations.  To do this, we apply a finite element  method 
with  piecewise  linear shape  functions.  Define  the approximation  to G, 
12. A more detailed technical  appendix is available  upon request. See Hughes (1987)  for 
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i.e.,  Gh(x), as follows: 
nnodes 
Gh(x)  =  YaNa  (x), 
a=l 
where  Ya, a  =  1,  .  .  ,nnodes  is a vector  of constants  and  Na(x), x  = 
(x, y) for the two-dimensional  case is given by the hat-shaped  functions, 
x-XX 
y- 
yYY  X  - Xa XY  Ya  a  X  Y  Ya 
Xa  X  al, Ya CY  _<  Ya 
Xa -  Xa  Ya -Ya  a  a  x,-  x  y  -  y, 
Na(x)=  x-x  ya-y 
X  X  Xa, Ya  Y  Ya 
Xa  -  Ya  Ya 
a-  X  Ya-y 
a7 
x  x  ^  Xaf  Ya  Y  1  Ya 
Xa -Xa  Ya -  y 
0  elsewhere, 
where  xa =  (xa,ya)  is the  vector  of  coordinates  associated  with  node  a 
and [a,x]  x  [ya,ya]  is the rectangle for which Na(x) has a positive  value. 
Note  that Na(x) is equal to 1 at x  =  xa. The constants,  ,Ya are chosen  to 
satisfy  the following  equations 
H(y)  =  f  F(Gh(x);  x)Na(x)dx  =  0,  a =  1, ..  , nnodes  (A.1) 
where  y  =  [Y/, ...  , /nodes]  is a vector of length  m * nnodes and H has 
m *  nnodes elements.  Equation  (A.1)  is  the  weak  formulation  of  our 
problem. 
The  main  computational  task is to find  y such  that H(y)  =  0. If we 
use a Newton-Raphson  algorithm to find  y, then we choose  some initial 
guess,  say y?, and iterate as follows: 
yk+1  =  (yk _  J(yk)-IH(yk), 
where  J is the Jacobian of H. Because  Gh(x,) =  Ya  where  a is some  node 
on  the  grid,  starting  guesses  can easily  be obtained.  For the  examples 
of Section 3, we  started with  an increasing,  linear function  that is equal 
to steady-state  consumption  when  evaluated  at the steady-state  values 
of  private  and  public  capital.  Note  that  the  Newton  iterations  require 
algorithms  for solving  linear  systems,  Au  =  b, where  A  =  J(-k),  b  = 
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we  use  an iterative method  to solve  the linear system.  (For more detail, 
see  Saad,  1993). 
Appendix B 
In Section  2 we  calculated Solow's  residual for a production  technology 
that included  government  capital and  variation  in capacity  utilization. 
We  found  that,  once  we  accounted  for changes  in government  capital 
and changes  in utilization,  the growth in total factor productivity  during 
World  War II was  equal  to  its  average  postwar  rate.  In Section  3,  we 
decribed  a model  that  explores  the  effects  of  changes  in  government 
investment.  In this appendix,  we describe a model that allows  for varia- 
tion  in  the  workweek  of  capital  as  well  as  variations  in  government 
capital.13 
Assume  that there are a large number of ex ante identical agents with 
preferences 
E 2  Ptu(ct,  lt),  u(c, 1) =  (c-  I1  0  -  <B  ,  o > 0, 
t=O  1-  (0 
where  ct is consumption  at date t, lt is leisure  at date t, and ht =  1 -  It 
is  hours  spent  working  at date  t.  An  agent  that works  ht hours  with 
kt units  of  private  capital  and  kg,t units  of  public  capital  produces  a 
homogeneous  good,  Yt, with  the following  production  technology: 
Yt =  X{kt  +  kg,  t}ht. 
The good  can be consumed  or invested,  e.g.,  ct +  it +  ig,t +  bg  t  Yt. 
In specifying  the  production  technology,  we  assume  that private  and 
public capital are perfect  substitutes. 
Note  that  the  production  technology  exhibits  increasing  returns  to 
scale.  However,  if we  assume  that  agents  buy  and  sell  lotteries  over 
bundles  of  goods,  hours,  and  capital,  as  in  Prescott  and  Townsend 
(1984),  then  we  can  convexify  the  commodity  space.  Suppose  that 
agents,  in date 0, enter into contracts which  specify the number of hours 
to  work  and  the  number  of  units  of  capital  to  provide.  In return  for 
hours  and  capital,  the agents  receive  consumption  goods.  To compute 
their equilibrium  decisions,  we  can exploit  the fact that the competitive 
13. The model is similar  to that of Kydland  and Prescott  (1991).  We include conscription, 
government investment, and heterogeneity in preferences  over agents' employment 
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equilibrium  is Pareto optimal and solve the social planner's problem: 
oc 
max  E E  PIt{Fu(cl,t, 1 -  ht) +  (1 -  nt)u(c0,t, 1)}(1-  at) 
{c!,t,  CO,t,  ht, nt}  t=0 
subject to 
ntcl,t  +  (1  -  n,)co,t  +  it +  ig,t +  bg,t  c  X (  + 
)  ht  nt, 
and subject to the constraints  on capital, i.e., Equation  (4) of Section 3, 
where c1 is consumption of those working in the private sector, co is 
consumption of those not working, i is private  investment, ig  is govern- 
ment investment, bg  is government consumption, k is private capital, kg 
is government capital,  a is the fraction  of the population in the military, 
n is the fraction  of the civilian  population employed in the private  sector, 
and h is the number of hours that the plant is operated. The terms of 
the resource constraint  are per capita. 
In posing the planner's problem, we have imposed some restrictions. 
Hornstein and Prescott (1993) show that for the class of problems that 
includes ours, the equilibrium  consumption vector places mass on only 
two points. The first has zero hours and zero units of capital, and the 
agent receives c0  consumption goods. The second has a positive value 
for hours and capital and the agent receives cl consumption goods. 
Thus, we  need not search over all possible lotteries. To compute an 
equilibrium, we again use the procedure outlined in Appendix A. In 
this case, we find a function for consumption of the fraction  working, 
cl t. The consumption function is chosen to approximately  satisfy the 
intertemporal first-order  condition of the maximization problem. The 
remaining functions are derived from the intratemporal  first-order  con- 
ditions and the solution for the consumption function of the working 
agents. 
One advantage of this model over that of Section 3 is that it allows 
us to explore the role of capacity utilization. In Section 3, we assumed 
that the only way to increase current  output was to change the number 
of hours that the stand-in consumer worked. In the environment de- 
scribed here, both hours per worker and the number of workers can 
be varied. During war, we observe large changes in both margins. In 
addition, during wars we see the output-capital  ratio rising at the same 
time average productivity  rises. Our previous specification  was inconsis- 
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products  may rise concurrently.  Another  advantage  of this model  is its 
differential  treatment  of workers  in the military and the private sector. 
Because  all agents  in Section 3 are ex post identical,  we assume  that the 
representative  agent  spends  some  fraction  of  his  time  in  production, 
some  fraction of his  time in the military,  and  some  fraction of his time 
in leisure  activities.  We do not distinguish  civilian and noncivilian  em- 
ployment.  As  a result,  we  find that the hours  of work  decision  is very 
sensitive  to the  rate of conscription  since  hours  of work  in the  private 
sector and hours  of work in the military have  the same effect on utility. 
In the course  of analyzing  this model,  we  have uncovered  the follow- 
ing  peculiar  property.  In equilibrium,  hours  of work  do not vary  over 
time.  To see  this,  consider  the first-order necessary  conditions  for con- 
sumption,  employment,  and hours  of work: 
du(c,  t, 1)  _  au(cl, t1  -  ht) 
aco, t  acl,  t 
au(cl,t,  1  -  ht)  _  au(cl,,  1  -  ht) x(kt  +  kg,t)On-e 
nt  Ot  ac-, ,t 
s 
cl, t 
u(c1,  1  n-h)  -  u(c0t,  1)  -  (c  t) 
x  (C1,t  -  cO,t  -  (1 -  O)X(kt  +  kg,t)0nt ht). 
The  first condition  equates  the  marginal  utilities  of  the  two  types  of 
agents.  The  second  condition  equates  the  ratio of the  marginal  utility 
of leisure  of the  working  agent  to the  marginal benefit  of running  the 
plant an extra hour.  The third condition  equates  the change  in welfare 
caused  by one  more person  working  to the additional  output  produced 
by  having  an  additional  employee.  With  some  manipulation  of  these 
three equations,  we  have  the following  condition: 
_1(1_h){(l-ht)  }  =  (1  - 0)h,  -y 
1-  - 
(B.1) 
Notice that this formula involves  only ht and the parameters of the utility 
and production  functions.  Therefore, ht  must be constant in equilibrium. 
Furthermore,  there  are only  two  fixed  points  of Equation (B.1), ht =  0 
and 0 <  ht <  1. This follows  from the fact that the left-hand  side of the 
equation  is  a concave  function  that is equal  to 0 if ht =  0,  1 if ht =  1 
and  has  a derivative  equal  to 1 at 0. If 0 <  0 <  1, then  the  right-hand 244  BRAUN & MCGRATTAN 
side  has  a slope  that is between  0 and  1. Therefore,  the linear function 
(1 -  0)ht crosses  the concave  function  twice,  once at 0 and once at some 
point  in (0,1).  We can exclude  the ht =  0 outcome  because  it is not an 
optimum.  Therefore,  to  calculate  the  equilibrium  hours  decision,  we 
find the positive  fixed point  of Equation (B.1). 
The prediction  that hours  per worker are constant  is at odds  with  the 
data.  At the  aggregate  level,  hours  per worker  rose 20% between  1939 
and  1942. Large increases  were  also  observed  in many  industries.  For 
example,  the  average  hours  worked  per week  in the machine  tools  in- 
dustry rose 22.6% between  1939 and 1942.14  Thus,  while  this model  can 
account for the growth  in total factor productivity  during World War II, 
its predictions  for hours  per worker do not match up with  the observa- 
tions  in the data. 
One way  of resolving  this problem is to allow for differential costs  of 
entering  the  labor force.  It is  unlikely  that  the  disutility  of  a woman 
with  six children  who  enters  the labor force is equal to that of a woman 
with  no children.  Suppose  that individual  preferences  are given  by 
E E  t{{u(ct,  1 -  ht) -  TX{ht>O} 
t=0 
where  lq  measures  the disutility  of entering  the work force, and X is an 
indicator function.  If the utility costs  of entering  the work force vary, Tl 
will  have  a  nondegenerate  distribution.  If civilians  are  aligned  with 
points  on the interval  [0, 1 -  a), then we  can construct a cost function. 
For example,  suppose  that agents  are aligned  in such  a way  that costs 
are represented  by a linear, increasing  function.  Then, in the aggregate, 
the costs  of increasing  employment  are given  by 
-(1  -  a)  (0  + 21ls)ds =  -(1  -  a){on  +  1  n2}, 1 > 0, 
fo 
where  a is the fraction of people  in the military, and n is the fraction of 
civilians  who  work.  If preferences  are redefined  with  this  additional 
term, it is no longer  true that hours  per week  remain fixed in response 
to large fiscal shocks.  If the costs  of increasing  employment  are high,  it 
may be optimal  to vary hours.  The magnitude  of costs  required to pro- 
duce  plausible  variation in hours  per worker is an open  question. 
14. See  the  December  1942 issue  of  the  Survey of Current Business for average  hours  in 
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Comment 
J. BRADFORD  DE LONG 
Harvard  University  and  NBER 
During World War II in the United  States, real production  boomed.  The 
sudden  surge in aggregate  demand  from government  wartime spending 
was  accompanied  by  a surge  in  production  and  employment.  Private 
consumption  and  investment  fell.  Real interest  rates  fell  to  less  than 
zero.  Real wages  and labor productivity  rose  significantly. 
I have  never  thought  that economists  should  try to account  for the 
World  War II experience  using  a market-clearing,  competitive  model. 
The government  did much  to create false prices,  shortages,  and market 
failures during  the war: Episodes  of rationing  and indicative  planning, 
negotiations  between  corporatist  groups  of executives  and  Galbraith's 
OPM, and direct control of resources-primarily  labor through the draft 
and its pattern of exemptions,  but also capital-fill  administrative  histo- 
ries of World War II. Moreover,  the government  tried to operate its war 
economy  by  changing  tastes  themselves:  They  tried  to  create  a taste 
among  women  and  other  secondary  workers  for  defense  work,  and 
they  tried to create a taste for holding  government  debt independent  of 
the  coupon  it paid.  Looking  at the  speed  of the  shifts  in employment 
patterns,  and  at the  willingness  of U.S.  investors  to hold  government 
bonds  during the war, I think the government  was relatively successful. 
Nevertheless,  Braun and McGrattan try to account for the U.S. World 
War II experience  (and for the British experience  and World War I expe- 
rience)  using  a market-clearing,  competitive  model.  They  focus  on  an 
anomaly  that Rotemberg and Woodford  (1992) pointed  out: In a compet- 
itive model,  increased  labor input is associated  with lower labor produc- 
tivity and lower real wages.  But labor productivity  and real wages  were 
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high during World War II-between  30 and 40% higher than one would 
have  expected  before  the  war.  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  interpret  in- 
creased  productivity  (and real wages)  as employment  expands  as a sign 
that the representative  firm is operating  at less  than efficient  scale, and 
following  Hall  suggest  that the  representative  firm is best  modeled  as 
an imperfect  competitor. 
With  this  point  Braun and  McGrattan take issue.  They  argue  that a 
competitive  model  is  perfectly  capable  of  generating  an  increase  not 
only in output  and employment  but also in productivity  and real wages 
as a consequence  of an increase  in government  purchases.  "Suppose," 
Braun  and  McGrattan  say,  "the  government  is  providing  firms  with 
capital  to  be  used  in  production  .  .  .  [W]ages  and  productivity  .  .  . 
will  eventually  rise  [in  response  to  a  demand  shock]  if  government 
investment  produces  a large enough  shift in the labor demand  sched- 
ule."  Productivity  rises  with  a  government  spending  demand  shock 
because  the government  spending  demand  shock is associated  with  an 
increase  in the  capital-labor ratio and,  thus,  in the productive  capacity 
of the economy.  They calibrate the model  and find that "historical fluc- 
tuations  in government  investment  during  World War II are of a suffi- 
cient  magnitude  to  predict  a  positive  correlation  between  hours  and 
productivity  during  periods  of war." 
On reading  this,  my first thought  was  skeptical.  In 1958 dollars,  pre- 
World War II GDP was  about $200 billion.  Braun and McGrattan report 
that the  U.S.  government  had  invested  $25 billion  (in 1958 dollars)  in 
government-owned  but  privately  operated  (GOPO) capital by  1943. If 
one  assumes  this  capital  yielded  a gross  return  of  20% per  year,  the 
U.S.  government's  investments  would  have boosted  1943 output  by $5 
billion-2.5%.  But between  1938 and 1943, real wages  in manufacturing 
and labor productivity  rose between  30 and 40%. It is hard to see  how 
the  government's  investments  could  have  more  than  a  second-order 
impact on  the cyclicality of labor productivity  during  World War II. 
How,  then,  do Braun and McGrattan manage  to conclude  otherwise: 
that GOPO capital is of first-order importance  in explaining  procyclical 
productivity  during  World War II? One  part of the answer  is that their 
capital stock measures  appear too low.  The capital stock aggregate  that 
they  use,  which  is  shown  in Figure 2,  is equipment  and  structures  in 
manufacturing-a  much  smaller  aggregate  than  the  total capital used 
to  produce  GDP.  They  have  implicitly  assumed  a very  high  marginal 
return to investments  in manufacturing  capital-their  36% capital share 
combined  with  a capital output  ratio of 0.4 implies  a private return on 
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Moreover,  there  appears  to be an additional,  more important  factor. 
The  $25  billion  1958 dollar  investment  in  capital  by  the  government 
between  1938 and 1943 has,  in Braun and McGrattan's production  func- 
tion with  p =  0.5,  the same effect on productivity  as a 2.5-fold  multipli- 
cation-from  $80 to $194 billion-in  the  private manufacturing  capital 
stock.  The  rate of  return  on  GOPO  capital  in  Braun and  McGrattan's 
model  appears  to  be  four  times  the  rate  of  return  on  private  invest- 
ments-360%  per year. In Braun and McGrattan's model  with  p =  1.0, 
the  return is only  one  fourth  as much  but is still very  large relative to 
the returns to privately  owned  and  operated  capital. 
Thus,  in  Braun and  McGrattan's  setup,  government  investments  in 
capital are the ultimate  free lunch.  Their model  implies  that an activist 
U.S.  government  should  strain every  nerve  to create GOPO  capital- 
and would  be enormously  successful  if it did so. 
The implication,  of course,  is that Braun and McGrattan's calibration 
is badly awry. The government  did invest  substantially  in capital during 
World War II, and it did lease this capital out to private firms to operate. 
But when  Braun and McGrattan write of what  GOPO capital was,  they 
write of increases  in "the productive  capacity of the automotive,  aircraft, 
and aluminum  industries."  They write  of how  producers,  uncertain  of 
postwar  demand,  demanded  that  the  government  finance  a share  of 
their expansion  of capacity-not  of how  producers  asked  that the gov- 
ernment  provide  special  types  of capital that it alone  could  make  that 
would  make  private investments  more productive. 
Why is GOPO capital so productive  in Braun and McGrattan's setup? 
In one  model  they  simply  assume  that  private  and  GOPO  capital are 
strong  complements.  In  another  model  in  which  government-owned 
and  privately  owned  capital  are perfect  substitutes,  high  productivity 
during  the  war  cannot  be  attributed  to  a  high  level  of  government- 
owned  capital because  the correlation of government-owned  capital and 
output  is negative. 
Why  do  Braun and  McGrattan get  caught  in  this  particular trap? I 
think  (and here let me beat my own  drum) that the reason  is that they 
are not  economic  historians.  An economic  historian  telling  the story of 
increased  productivity  during  World  War II would  find  it difficult  to 
avoid discussing  the details of at least one industry.  And for historians, 
God is in the details.  Braun and McGrattan write of how GOPO capacity 
is important  in the  aircraft, aluminum,  and automobile  industries.  But 
they  do  not  go  back to  the  details  of  any  one  industry-do  not  even 
think of returning to the aircraft production  industry,  and showing  how 
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capital.  They  remain  at the  level  of the  macroeconomist.  They  do  not 
descend  to the level  of the economic  historian,  where  complementarity 
of  capital  goods  calls  for demonstration  that  the  productivity  of  each 
kind of capital good  was greatly multiplied  by the presence  of the other. 
So I conclude  that Braun and  McGrattan have  not  made  a case  that 
procyclical productivity  in World War II is consistent  with a competitive 
model.  Labor productivity  increased by 30% in the United States during 
World War II-an  extra gain in output  of roughly  60 billion 1958 dollars 
a year. If this had been  generated  by additional  capital yielding  20% per 
year, the investments  would  have  to be on the order of 300 billion 1958 
dollars.  But Braun and McGrattan have only 25 billion dollars of GOPO 
capital.  The  effects  they  point  to are there  but are only  one  tenth  the 
size  needed  to account  for the World War II experience. 
What about the other 90% of the productivity  gains of World War II? 
What  accounts  for them?  Some  part is  surely  generated  by  increased 
work  effort: People  work  harder  if the  job is  not  just  to  earn  money 
but  is  worth  doing  for  its  own  sake  to  defeat  Hitler.  Some  part  is 
surely generated  by the imperfect competition  mechanisms  of Hall, and 
Rotemberg  and  Woodford.  Some  part is  surely  the  high  valuation  we 
place on military goods-whose  value  is determined  not by consumers 
but by governments.  But we  do not have  a good  breakdown.  It is good 
to have  a good  account  of even  10%. 
Comment 
JULIO  J. ROTEMBERG 
Sloan School of Management,  MIT 
This paper  is in three  parts.  The first part is my  favorite.  It lays  out  a 
great  number  of  interesting  facts  concerning  the  two  world  wars  in 
both the United  Kingdom  and the United  States. There are clearly some 
similarities between  the two experiences  because  output  and productiv- 
ity rose in all four episodes.  But, what is probably even more interesting 
are the differences  between  the U.S.  and the U.K. behavior  of employ- 
ment  and real wages. 
The  second  part of  the  paper  presents  a general  equilibrium  model 
that  captures  Braun and  McGrattan's  theory  of why  productivity  and 
output  rose  in  the  first place.  Their theory  of  the  initial expansion  in 
output  is traditional: Output  rose because  there was an increase in labor 
supply,  which  was  itself  the  result  of  the  wealth  reduction  brought 
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about by the war. What is more novel is their theory of why productivity 
rose.  They  attribute this to an increase  in government-owned  privately 
operated  (GOPO)  capital.  In calling  for increased  focus  on GOPO,  the 
authors  are  surely  right.  GOPO  capital  is,  as  pointed  out  initially  by 
Robert Gordon  (1969), a very  large component  of capital by the end  of 
the war. 
The third part of the paper  argues  that the  model  and,  thus,  GOPO 
capital,  can explain  the behavior  of productivity  and real wages  in the 
aftermath of increases  in military spending.  This is the weakest  part of 
the paper.  I feel that much  more effort needs  to be spent  analyzing  the 
specific  consequences  of  the  GOPO  program  before  we  will  know  its 
contributions  to productivity  and real wages. 
I will start my discussion  by talking about the model.  Then I will talk 
about the evaluation  of the contribution  of GOPO capital. Then,  finally 
I will have  some  comments  on the difference  between  the U.S.  and the 
U.K.  behavior  of real wages. 
1. The  Model 
Their model is one where  output is produced  with a production  function 
that depends  on the aggregate  labor input,  the aggregate  private capital 
stock, and GOPO capital. The model  assumes  that, except for the choice 
of  GOPO  capital,  the  other  economic  decisions  are made  by  a central 
planner  who  maximizes  expected  discounted  utility.  I must  say that I 
preferred  the  previous  version  of  this  paper  where  the  outcome  was 
decentralized  and  production  decisions  were  made  by  firms.1 In that 
earlier version,  the  firms were  perfect competitors  who  had  each been 
given  an endowment  of GOPO and  sold  their output  at marginal cost. 
Both versions  suffer from the problem that output in the model differs 
from measured  GNP.  In the  current paper,  the  value  of output  is the 
value  of what is produced  with  all three inputs.  That would  correspond 
to measured  GNP only if all this output  were  sold in the market. In the 
previous  version,  this  was  even  clearer because  the  firms  did  indeed 
sell all their output  to the government  at marginal cost. 
1. One advantage of dealing with a market  equilibrium  is that there it gives a rationale 
for aggregating  the outputs of different goods by using their prices as weights as is 
done in the National  Income  Accounts. The reason  is that, in a competitive  equilibrium 
a good that gives ten times as much utility as another will have a price ten times as 
large. There is then some basis for saying that one unit of this good adds ten times as 
much to consumption, investment, or government  purchases.  By contrast,  prices  don't 
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But,  at least  in the  United  States,  the  government  was  also  the  sole 
purchaser  of  the  output  produced  with  GOPO.  This  matters  because 
there is no reason  for the government  to pay the firms the entire value 
of the output.  Indeed,  if the output  is sold at marginal cost even  though 
the  firms  have  been  given  a  GOPO  endowment,  then  the  firms  will 
make positive  profits. 
In the  United  States,  plants  with  GOPO  were  operated  under  two 
regimes.  In  one  regime,  the  government  hired  the  private  company 
as a contractor  and  made  a payment  for the  services  provided  by  the 
contractor.  In another  (called  "Cost  Plus Fixed Fee"),  the  government 
reimbursed  the  contractor for its cost  and  added  a prespecified  profit. 
In  either  case,  we  would  not  expect  the  firms  to  make  any  unusual 
profits;  there  would  be  no  reason  for the  government  to  pay  for the 
services  of  the  capital  that it had  itself  provided.  Thus,  the  payments 
from  the  government  would  fall well  short  of  what  it would  have  to 
pay  to  buy  the  same  goods  in  the  open  market.  But,  it is  only  these 
payments  from the  government,  rather than  the value  of total output, 
that  are counted  in  GNP.  (The  reason  is  that  GNP  does  not  include 
the services  provided  by government-owned  capital.) Thus, the authors 
overstate  the  theoretical  effects  of government  purchases  on GNP. 
2. The  Evaluation  of the  Model 
The existence  of price controls  and rationing  make it unlikely  that any 
general  equilibrium  model  is  exactly  right,  and  this  may  well  be  the 
reason  why  the  authors  moved  to a specification  where  prices play no 
role. It would  have preferred it if, instead,  they had made a larger effort 
in specifying  which  parts of the  model  can be tested  even  in the pres- 
ence  of rationing.  Given  the widespread  rationing  of consumer  goods, 
it  seems  reasonable  to  believe  that  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution 
between  consumption  and leisure  could well be different from the pub- 
lished  ratio of the nominal  wage  to the CPI. My sense  is that, instead, 
Braun and McGrattan are mainly  concerned  with  explaining  the behav- 
ior of productivity  and real wages  with  a model  where  price is always 
equal to marginal cost and where  there are diminishing  returns to labor. 
Insofar  as  firms  were  not  rationed  in  the  amount  of  inputs  that  they 
could  buy  or in  the  amount  of  output  they  could  sell,  the  validity  of 
this  part  of  the  model  can  be  ascertained  with  productivity  and  real 
wage  data for the period. 
Braun and McGrattan are surely right that GOPO contributed  to pro- 
ductivity  growth  and to the rise in real wages  during  the World War II 
period  in the United  States.  The question  they  have  not settled  is how Comment  *  253 
Table 1  OUTPUT  AND THE  AVERAGE  PRODUCT  OF LABOR 
IN SELECTED  INDUSTRIESa 
Food  and  food 
Stone,  clay, and  glass  products  Tobacco  products 
Year  Output  APL  Output  APL  Output  APL 
1940  100  100  100  100  100  100 
1941  125.97  104.57  112.40  105.04  110.33  105.76 
1942  125.48  104.25  126.19  105.83  120.50  109.67 
aThe output series is the industrial  production  index from the Federal  Reserve Bulletin.  The hours 
series needed to construct  the average product  of labor  are constructed  by multiplying  "Factory  Em- 
ployment"  with "Average  Hours Worked  per Week"  from  the same source. 
much  GOPO  contributed.  It appears  from  their  discussion  that  they 
think GOPO explained  a very large fraction of the increase in productiv- 
ity and real wages.  That seems  unlikely  to me.  First, this view  is incon- 
sistent  with  the post-World  War II facts. As Hall (1988) and Rotemberg 
and Woodford  (1992) have shown,  productivity  and real wages  also rose 
together  with  military purchases  after World War II even  though  GOPO 
did  not  exhibit  unusual  growth  during  the  Korean or Vietnam  Wars. 
Whatever  led  productivity  and  real wages  to rise in  this  other  period 
must  have  been  at work in World War II as well. 
There is also some more direct evidence  that GOPO can't be the whole 
story. First, I analyzed  the behavior of output  and average labor produc- 
tivity in industries  where  GOPO was  not important.  Table 1 shows  the 
behavior  of output  and the average product of labor in Stone,  Clay, and 
Glass; Food; and Tobacco for the years  1940-1942. 
The output  and the productivity  of all three industries  rose from 1940 
to 1941. The Food  and Tobacco industries  became  important  suppliers 
for the war effort,  and their output  continued  rising from 1941 to 1942. 
What is interesting  is that,  in spite  of the absence  of significant  GOPO 
in  these  industries  productivity  rose  as  well.  From  1941 to  1942,  the 
Stone,  Clay, and Glass industry  contracted because  construction  slowed 
down  considerably.  As  we  would  expect  from  Hall's  findings  for the 
postwar  era, productivity  in this industry  fell as well.2 
Figure  1 shows  evidence  that GOPO  does  not  explain  the  entire  in- 
crease  in real wages  either.  This figure,  which  was  part of early drafts 
2. If one  takes  the  view  of  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1992) that  increases  in  military 
purchases  raise economic  activity by raising labor demand,  then the fall in construction 
activity  also  rationalizes  the  fall in  the  real wages  of  skilled  building  workers  docu- 
mented  in Bry (1960) and cited in Braun and McGrattan's paper. 254  ROTEMBERG 
Figure 1 WAGES,  FEDERAL  PURCHASES,  AND PRIVATE  VALUE  ADDED 
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of Rotemberg  and Woodford  (1992), shows  the changes  in real military 
purchases,  in privately  produced  real value  added  and  the changes  of 
the logarithm  of real wages.  Real wages  are deflated  by the deflator for 
private  value  added,  which  is  what  is  relevant  if one  is  asking  about 
the  relationship  between  the  marginal  product  of  labor  and  the  real 
wage.3 We see that there was already a substantial increase in real wages 
between  1940 and  1941, even  though  GOPO capital at the  end  of 1940 
(i.e.,  capital we  would  typically  view  as available for 1941 production) 
was trivial.4 It also shows  that real wages  declined  together with private 
output  and military purchases  in 1944-1946.  While this is not shown  in 
Figure 1, productivity  declined  as well at the end of the war. But, GOPO 
capital rose  significantly  from  1942 to  1945 and  stayed  high  thereafter. 
Thus,  I think it is impossible  to explain  either the timing of the increase 
in real wages  and productivity  or their subsequent  fall at the end of the 
war by attributing them  exclusively  to the changes  in GOPO. 
3. Braun and McGrattan  use the real wage deflated by the CPI. This is the wage that 
would be relevant if they were looking at the first-order  condition relating the real 
wage to the marginal  rate of substitution  of consumption for leisure. 
4. According to the BLS  Fixed  Reproducible  Capital  in the United  States,  1925-1979 (1982), 
there was less than $1 billion 1972 dollars of GOPO capital at the end of 1940. This 
compares with $8 billion at the end of 1941, $28 billion at the end of 1942, and $47 
billion at the end of 1944. Comment 255 
3. The  United  Kingdom  versus  the United  States 
I want  to close by commenting  on the difference  in the behavior  of real 
wages  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States.  This  difference 
has been  noted  before by Correia, Neves,  and Rebelo (1992), who  argue 
that the negative  correlation between  real wages  and military purchases 
in the United  Kingdom  provides  evidence  for the standard neoclassical 
model  of government  spending.  This negative  correlation is principally 
due  to  the  behavior  of  British  real  wages  during  World  War I.  The 
problem is that measuring  British real wages  in this period is apparently 
subject to great difficulty. 
For the period  with  which  I will be concerned,  i.e.,  that from 1914 to 
1924, the authors  use  the index  of wages  presented  in Feinstein  (1972). 
As  pointed  out  by  Dowie  (1975),  this  index  is  identical  to  that which 
Bowley  first published  in  1921 and  then  supplemented  in monthly  is- 
sues  of the London  and Cambridge  Economic  Service Bulletin. Dowie  (1975) 
criticizes this index  and recommends  that for the period 1914-1924,  one 
use  instead  Feinstein's  (1972) index  of weekly  earnings.  The use  of this 
alternative  index  makes  a big difference. 
Figure 2 presents  data on both real expenditures  on national  defense 
and  two  series  for British  real wages.  The  first is  the  wage  series  in 
Feinstein  (1972) that Braun and McGrattan use,  though  I have  deflated 
it by the GDP deflator. The second,  alternative series, uses  the Feinstein 
wage  series up until 1914. From 1914 to 1924, it uses  instead the percent- 
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age changes  in the Feinstein  earnings series,  which  it applies  to the 1914 
base.  Finally,  I follow  the  authors  and  use  the  percentage  changes  in 
the  Feinstein  wage index  from  1924 on.  Because  the  alternative  series 
grows  20% more between  1914 and 1924, the line representing  the alter- 
native wage  remains above the original series after 1924. If one uses  this 
alternative wage  series,  real wages  rise together with military purchases 
during  World War I. 
As Dowie  (1975) shows,  the problem with  the original Bowley  (1921) 
series,  which  is  the  basis  of  the  Feinstein  (1972) wage  series,  is  that 
Bowley  himself  later changed  his mind about the growth rate in nominal 
wages  from 1914 to 1924. While his  original index  grew  by 74% in this 
period,  he  concluded  in  Bowley  (1952)  that  earnings  for  a  "normal 
week"  grew  by 94% in this  period.  Moreover,  Bowley  is quite  explicit 
that  this  growth  in  weekly  earnings  does  not  involve  any  changes  in 
hours  worked.  He  says,  "The intention  throughout  has  been  to mea- 
sure  the  change  in  wages  paid  for  unchanged  work  in  the  number 
of hours  that at each  date  constitute  a normal  week  without  overtime 
or  short  time"  (Bowley,  1952,  p.  500).  As  further  confirmation  that 
he  viewed  hourly  wages  as  having  risen  by  94%, Bowley  (1952) pro- 
vides  a  new  wage  series  that  grows  by  that  amount  between  1914 
and  1924.  The  problem  with  this  newer  Bowley  series  is  that,  as 
pointed  out  by  Dowie  (1975),  it  is  quite  arbitrary. It simply  spreads 
evenly  over  the  1914-1919  period  the  difference  between  the  74% in- 
crease  of  the  original  series  and  the  94% that  he  ultimately  deemed 
accurate. 
These  problems  lead Dowie  (1975) to prefer the Feinstein  (1972) series 
on weekly  earnings.  In principle,  changes  in this series could be due not 
only to wage  changes  but also to changes  in hours worked.  However,  as 
Dowie  reconstructs  this series,  changes  in hours worked  appear to play 
no  role  in  the  measurements  between  1914 and  1924.  In  particular, 
Feinstein's  (1972) earnings  series  grows  by  94% from  1914 to  1924 as 
the  hourly  wage  series  is  supposed  to.  Moreover,  the  movements  in 
the  series  from 1920 to 1924 are based  on the movements  of published 
wage  data that are not affected  by changes  in hours. 
My conclusion  from this  is not  that I am sure that real wages  really 
did indeed  rise with  military purchases  during World War I. It is rather, 
as Dowie  (1975) also concludes,  that we have very little reliable informa- 
tion  on  this  question.  The  data do  seem  more  reliable for World War 
II. British real wages  also  rose  in World War II although,  admittedly, 
only  well  after military purchases  became  substantial.  What is striking 
is  that,  as  in  the  United  States,  real wages  fell together  with  military 
purchases  at the end  of the war. Discussion 257 
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Discussion 
Bob Gordon,  "Mr. GOPO himself"  according to Olivier Blanchard, had 
several  remarks.  First, he  agreed  with  the basic  idea  expressed  in the 
Comment  by Brad De Long,  which  is that at $25 billion GOPO was just 
too  small  to  explain  why  real GDP in  1958 dollars  increased  by  more 
than $100 billion.  Second,  Gordon noted  that the experience  in the U.S. 
economy  immediately  following  World  War II is  also  instructive.  Per 
capita GDP fell substantially  after the war until around  1950. Similarly, 
productivity  growth  declined  before picking up during the period 1948- 
1951. The  reason  for these  movements,  Gordon  suggested,  is the  Ko- 
rean War: Much of the GOPO capital sold to private operators after the 
war was  specifically  tailored to wartime  use.  Military expenditures  as a 
share  of  GDP jumped  to  10% during  the  Korean War, and  this  post- 
World War II variation may be useful  in pinning  down  the contributions 
of GOPO capital. 
Finally,  Gordon  emphasized  the importance  of capacity utilization  in 
understanding  the  procyclicality  of labor productivity.  Capital services 
rather  than  the  capital  stock  is  the  correct input  into  the  production 
function,  and if the number  of worked  shifts increased  during the war, 
this difference  can be important.  In terms of separating  this effect from 
the contribution  of GOPO capital, Gordon suggested  that examining  the 
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nonfarm,  nonmanufacturing  sectors,  which  employed  very little GOPO 
capital, could be used  to control for utilization-related  jumps  in produc- 
tivity. 
Braun remarked  that GOPO capital is only  one  of the factors driving 
the  results.  Much  of  the  dynamics  arise  from  the  standard  models  of 
the  response  of  the  economy  to  a temporary  rise in government  pur- 
chases.  The  contribution  of  GOPO  is to produce  an increasing  capital 
stock during the war, which  can help to explain the rise in hours worked 
and productivity. 
Several participants including  Geoff Carliner and Inderjit Singh won- 
dered  about  the  role  of  rationing  and  patriotism  during  wartime.  In 
particular,  Carliner noted  that the results  of the competitive  model  ig- 
noring  rationing  predict consumption  fairly accurately.  Does  this mean 
that rationing  played  no role? McGrattan responded  that the paper ab- 
stracts from many  things,  including  rationing,  patriotism,  learning  by 
doing,  and  capacity  utilization.  The purpose  of this abstraction was  to 
focus  on  a  simple  model  in  which  the  government  extracts  hours 
through  conscription  and  output  for investment  to see  how  successful 
such  a  model  would  be.  Responding  to  Carliner's  specific  point, 
McGrattan suggested  that rationing would  likely change the results, but 
it is not clear exactly how  they  would  change. 
Carliner also  asked  why  people  stored  their  wealth  in  government 
bonds  during  the war.  Shouldn't  they  have  anticipated  that the repay- 
ment  of  the  postwar  debt  would  occur through  seignorage  as well  as 
taxation when  the wartime  price controls were released? Bob Hall noted 
that  traditionally  the  government  induced  bondholding  and  an  in- 
creased  labor  supply  by  promising,  contingent  on  winning  the  war, 
postwar  deflation.  For example,  this  was  the  approach  taken  in  the 
United  States  during  the  Civil  War and,  to  some  extent,  after World 
War I. World War II was  the  first clear situation  in which  the  govern- 
ment  failed,  opportunistically  in fact, to deliver on the implicit promise 
of a high  return on  its wartime  debt.  In so  doing,  the  federal  govern- 
ment  probably  lost  the  ability  to  induce  the  labor  supply  response 
through  this traditional mechanism. 
Singh  suggested  that the  discussion  of the  effects  of large increases 
in government  expenditure  on  the  economy  led naturally to the ques- 
tion  of  what  would  happen  if  government  expenditures  were  to  fall 
drastically,  as is currently  the case in much  of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet  Union.  Would  a similar analysis  apply,  or would  the dif- 
ference  in organizational  structure be overwhelming? 